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Abstract
Through extending a standard Grossman and Stiglitz (1980) noisy rational expecta-
tions economy by a heterogeneous signal structure with signal-specific differences in
uncertainty, we show that price momentum as well as reversal are not intrinsically
at odds with rational behavior. Differences in information quality in combination
with asymmetric information lead to an under- and over-reaction in equilibrium
prices. We derive our results in a standard setup in which information asymmetry
is mimicked by access to the realization of a certain signal including its quality, as
well as in an environment in which signal quality is the only source of information
asymmetry. Both scenarios support price patterns like momentum and reversal in a
competitive rational expectations equilibrium without implying investor irrational-
ity. Furthermore, we are able to show that in equilibrium it is always rational for
agents to draw inference on their information sets, even in a ”second-best” way. By
”second best”, we refer to the notion that the way in which agents process their in-
formation might result in systematic mistakes owing to the existence of asymmetric
information regarding signal precision.
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1 Introduction
This paper targets one of the most pervasive but probably least understood mechanisms
in the process of stock price formation, which is rather in tension with the classical eco-
nomic notion of rationality and efficient markets: the emergence of price momentum and
reversal. The literature considers reversal as market over-reaction, while momentum is
interpreted as both a consequence of market under-reaction (e.g., Jegadeesh & Titman,
1993) as well as the result of market over-reaction (e.g., Lee & Swaminathan, 2000). We
provide an explanation for the existence of momentum (reversal) patterns in a compet-
itive rational expectations model. In our model, momentum and reversal occur in the
aftermath of the initial under- and over-reaction of equilibrium prices.
The main building block is a noisy rational expectations economy in the style of
Grossman and Stiglitz (1980). In this setting, risk-averse agents trade a risky asset based
on private as well as public information. We extend the model by adding an additional
layer of information allowing for different types of private information. Hence, we assume
that private information has two major components. First, the intrinsic value of the
information itself, defined by simply being granted access to information. This covers the
classical notion of information in the literature, mostly modeled by observing the realiza-
tion of a private signal. Second, we regard the ability to evaluate the received information
appropriately, as an autonomous component. In most models, this constitutes an implicit
assumption. We challenge the existing notion of information as a homogeneous signal
that everyone involved is always capable to process correctly.
In reality, information is far too diverse and complex as to be regarded as homo-
geneous. Many different types of information exist, which might each require specific
methods of evaluation. For instance, information could differ along the lines of qual-
ity or thematic content, to name just two possibilities. It seems appropriate that these
distinctions have to be taken into account when trying to process information properly.
Our model allows for the suggested diversity within the information structure and agents
have to cope with the issue when exploiting their information. We mimic the diversity
of information by introducing two different signal regimes: one providing information
connected with a rather low uncertainty level and the other with a relatively higher level
of uncertainty. These two signal regimes fit the above interpretation of information hav-
ing a different quality or thematic content. Intuitively, in such a context the optimal
reaction to private as well as public information depends on the respective signal regime.
Without making the prevailing signal regime public knowledge, it is easy to guess that it
is impossible for the price system to convey all information and be strong-form efficient.1
1An equilibrium price is said to be strong-form efficient if it is a sufficient statistic for all of the
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This posits a problem to the agents, who gather their information from the price system.
The lack of awareness concerning the different types of information is at the heart
of our model. In the first part of the paper, we show that signals with low variance are
responsible for under-reaction, while signals associated with a higher variance are rather
connected to over-reaction. In the second part of the paper, we demonstrate that it is
actually sufficient to impose uncertainty regarding the signal regime to establish the de-
scribed price patterns. The underlying value of the signal can be common knowledge. As
an illustration, suppose that a risk-averse agent observes a signal, but has no idea about
its quality. He will either a priori make a guess and opt for a specific quality or value the
information somewhere in between its potential states of quality. Both strategies result
in a systematic deviation from optimal behavior given full information. In the latter sit-
uation, the agent will always either overstate the quality of the signal in the event of the
high-variance signal translating into an over-reaction, or understate the quality of the
low-variance signal resulting in an under-reaction. Opting for the low-variance regime
ex ante, the agent overstates signal precision if the high-variance regime is in place. By
contrast, deciding for the high-variance regime ex ante, he will understate signal precision
in the low-variance regime. The described mechanics induce price momentum and price
reversal (under- and over-reaction) without relying on further assumptions like behavioral
biases or the existence of momentum traders.
We show that given the described signal structure, there exists an equilibrium that
fulfills the conditions of a noisy rational expectations equilibrium (REE) and produces
the desired price patterns when
• the economy exhibits asymmetric information regarding both types of information,
i.e. signal value and signal regime; and
• the economy exhibits asymmetric information only regarding the signal regime.
Furthermore, we prove that in neither of the above-stated scenarios are prices strong-form
efficient and able to convey all information inherited in the economy. Additionally, we
show that knowing about the type of information and how to correctly use it posits a
valuable asset.
The idea to distinguish thematic content along the lines of signal uncertainty is in line
with a prominent strand of empirical literature. It combines the idea of Odean (1998)
that people on the one hand are prone to place too much trust in information that is
low in precision and on the other hand place insufficient trust in information that is high
information in the economy.
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in precision, with empirical evidence on price momentum and reversal owing to certain
kinds of events. More precisely, evidence of price momentum has been detected for events
like earnings announcements (e.g., Bernard & Thomas, 1990), analyst forecast revisions
(e.g., L. K. C. Chan, Jegadeesh, & Lakonishok, 1996; Gleason & Lee, 2003) and share
repurchases (e.g., Lakonishok & Vermaelen, 1990), to name just a few, while reversal is
attributed to events like initial public offerings (Ritter, 1991), acquiring firms in merg-
ers (Agrawal, Jaffe, & Mandelker, 1992) or new exchange listings (Dharan & Ikenberry,
1995). It seems comprehensible that in general events producing momentum carry a dif-
ferent level of inherent uncertainty regarding their future implications than events giving
rise to reversals. Earnings announcements or share repurchases state hard facts with
respect to the situation of a company compared to announcements of an acquisition or
IPO, which could have several different implications and are complex to evaluate precisely.
Among the recent strand of literature attempting to explain price anomalies like
momentum and reversal with rational theories, our paper is most closely related to Holden
and Subrahmanyam (2002) and Cespa and Vives (2012). They attribute momentum to
an increase in information precision. This is comparable to the technical effect when the
uncertainty about the low-variance regime resolves. However, the intuitive ideas of the
two models are rather different. While our model concentrates on an additional feature
of information, Cespa and Vives (2012) assume information precision to increase with the
arrival of further fundamental information.
Andrei and Cujean (2017) also build on a Grossman and Stiglitz (1980) type of econ-
omy, although their economic intuition as well as their technical setting strongly differ
from our model. They model momentum as the consequence of a special type of informa-
tion diffusion, namely word-of-mouth communication. For this purpose, they introduce a
mechanism of information percolation originally developed by Duffie and Manso (2007)
into their noisy rational expectations model.
Our model further has a sharp distinction to Banerjee, Kaniel, and Kremer (2009),
who reason momentum with the existence of higher-order beliefs, which imply that agents
do not use prices correctly. They impose different beliefs, which in the literature is framed
that agents ”agree to disagree”. Upon first glance, it seems rather familiar with our setting
of having different signals that could not be distinguished precisely. However, there is
an economic difference if material information differs regarding its characteristics or if
agents cannot agree on the characteristics of a homogeneous signal.
Another popular method in the literature is to use growth-option models like Berk,
Green, and Naik (1999), Johnson (2002) and Sagi and Seasholes (2007). We significantly
distinguish our model from this strand of the literature as we solely concentrate on one
market and do not rely on the existence of additional derivative markets to establish our
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results.
Furthermore, our model does not contradict the well-established behavioral literature
related to momentum and reversal, (e.g. Barberis, Shleifer, & Vishny, 1998; Hong &
Stein, 1999; Daniel, Hirshleifer, & Subrahmanyam, 1998). However, we do not rely on
biases that are standard in this strand of the literature to generate the desired price
patterns. Nevertheless, these models seem complementary to ours. We could allow for
these biases in our model without annihilating the main results regarding the development
of prices but rather amplifying them.
In terms of the empirical literature, our model is also able to incorporate the view
of W. S. Chan (2003), who argues that investors under-react to informative information
signals while over-reacting to signals that are not informative. The model incorporates
this setting as a kind of corner solution when increasing the variance in the high-variance
regime to a sufficiently high level. Given this calibration, one of the signals is actually
non-informative. However, the established equilibrium results do not change given this
calibration.
The organization of the paper is as follows. In the next section, we provide a brief
overview of the most important features of noisy rational expectations models, as well as
how to solve for equilibrium in such a framework. In section 3, we introduce a one-period
static benchmark model and prove the existence of a general noisy REE in the defined
setup. Section 4 adds an additional trading period and establishes the price patterns of
over- and under-reaction in equilibrium prices given more than one trading round. Section
5 presents an extension of the model in which the uninformed agents observe the signal
but not its precision. Further equilibrium prices and price dynamics of the extended
model are derived and discussed. Concluding remarks are provided in section 6. All
derivations and proofs as well as computational details are relegated to the appendix.
2 General overview of the model
This section first rather generally outlines the most important features of REE models
and how they are connected to the model analyzed in this paper. Subsequently, we
provide a brief informal overview of the most important features of the model that we
present.
2.1 Rational Expectations Equilibria (REE)
The model is set up as a classical noisy REE model and is closely connected to Grossman
and Stiglitz (1980). In noisy REE models, all agents behave competitively and act as price
takers. According to Brunnermeier (2001, p. 66), each group of agents can be thought of
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as a ”continuum of clones” possessing identical private information. Assume an economy
with two kinds of assets: a riskless asset with a pay off of one, as well as a risky asset,
which has a stochastic pay off. Furthermore, there are two groups of different agents:
informed, I and uninformed, U . The informed agents observe a noisy signal S about the
pay off of the risky asset, while the uninformed do not. All distributional assumptions
made are common knowledge among all agents in the economy. Each agent maximizes
his expected utility by submitting demand schedules contingent on his information set.
Simultaneously submitting demand schedules allows traders to take prices as given since
it enables agents to submit a specific demand for each possible price. In addition to the
informed and uninformed agents, there exists noisy aggregate supply u, which is often
referred to as noise traders’ demand in the literature. The noisy aggregate supply prevents
the price system in the economy from being fully revealing (and is responsible for the
”noisy” in the term noisy REE). Denoting the demand of the informed agents by XI(S, p)
and the demand of the uninformed agents as XU(p), a REE equilibrium exists if both
agents submit demand schedules that maximize their expected utilities E [UI(XI(S, p))]
and E [UU(XU(p))] and there exists a price, p, which clears the market. In equilibrium,
the following two conditions have to hold.
1. Market Clearing:
XI(S, p) +XU(p) = u. (1)
2. Agents Optimization:
XI(S, p) ∈ arg maxE [UI(XI(S, p))|S, p] ,
XU(p) ∈ arg maxE [UU(XI(p))|p] .
(2)
A possible closed-form REE solution to the above-outlined setting is usually derived
applying a five-step procedure. First, conjecture a price function, which is simply a
mapping of the information sets of all agents into the price space. Second, derive the
posterior beliefs of all agents regarding the unknown variables of the economy, taking the
price conjecture of step one as given. Third, determine each agent’s optimal demand,
given the price conjecture and the posterior beliefs. Fourth, impose market clearing.
Finally, impose rationality by checking whether the conjectured price function of step
1 coincides with the actual price function derived in step 4. If the price conjecture is
confirmed to be self-fulfilling in step 5, the solution worked out constitutes an REE.
However, for some economies REEs do not exist.2 For their existence, it is crucial that
2For some economies, REEs do not exist. A detailed discussion of the necessary conditions for the
existence of equilibria in rational expectations models is given in O’hara (1995).
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agents recognize the information structure, e.g. that prices convey information and that
the information is measurable in excess demand functions.
The setting examined in this paper distinguishes itself from the above-outlined ”clas-
sical” framework by introducing heterogeneous information. The signal structure is no
longer limited to one kind of noisy signal, but rather allows for different kinds of signals
all having different characteristics. More specifically, we allow for two types of noisy sig-
nals that differ regarding their quality. We introduce one signal that is rather precise and
reliable and another signal that incorporates more uncertainty and hence is less precise.
Which type of signal actually occurs is determined exogenously and is not within the
responsibility of the agents.
One way to think of this in reality is having different sources of information that
discriminate concerning their quality, e.g. due to the skills of the analyst filing the infor-
mation. Since not every analyst covers every topic, the agent’s influence on the quality
of the information that he receives is limited. Nevertheless, to process the information
optimally, it is essential to have an idea about its quality. Another possible interpreta-
tion is the existence of different kinds of events, which are at the basis of the information
incorporated in the signal. The more precise signal could be e.g. thought of as an event
like an earnings announcement. Earnings announcements depict rather precise informa-
tion and thus they are assumed to be straightforward to analyze as they offer limited
room for interpretation. On the other hand, M&A announcements could be exemplified
as information containing a higher level of uncertainty. M&A announcements constitute
important information, but are very difficult to interpret. Reality has shown that the
actual consequences of mergers are a priori hard to predict.
In the remainder of the paper, we refer to the more reliable signal as the signal with
lower uncertainty. The situation in which the signal materializes is denoted as the low
uncertainty state or regime. The lower quality signal is referred to as the signal with high
uncertainty. The economy is labeled as being in the high uncertainty state or regime if this
signal occurs. The informed agent receives one of the two signals with an exogenously-
specified probability. However, he knows which of the two signals he observes. The
information set of the uninformed agent is analyzed along two different scenarios. In the
first scenario, the uninformed agent does not receive any signal at all, meaning that he
neither knows the value nor the quality of the signal; rather, he simply knows the signal
structure of the model, the distributional assumptions and that the informed agent has
observed one of two possible signals. In the second scenario, the uninformed agent is able
to observe the value of the signal but does not have any information about its type. We
analyze both settings separately, the former in sections 3 and 4, the latter in section 5.
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In the analysis, we intend to deflect the focus from the existence of equilibrium in
general to the implications of the signal structure on the equilibrium price. Nevertheless,
we will prove the existence and say something about uniqueness as well as the potential
equilibria’s most important properties. The focus is placed on the price process implied
by the existing equilibria. We concentrate on the possibility to generate price patterns of
over- and under-reaction, which are also discussed in the empirical literature. The idea
is to explain these patterns by a simple alteration of the signal structure within a noisy
REE.
2.2 Informal description of the model
In the economy analyzed in the following, the informed agents conduct their optimization
using the information inherited in the signal that they have received. The uninformed
do not know the value of the signal, nor do they know if the signal is of the high or low
uncertainty type. The supply of the risky asset—which in the literature is labeled noise
trader demand or aggregate endowment—is random. We assume that it is not observable
by the uninformed agents. However, this is not due to the usual reason of preventing
the price system from being fully revealing. Owing to the heterogeneous signal structure
incorporating two different signal regimes, the price system would not be revealing even
if the uninformed were able to observe aggregate demand. The technical reason is that
the mapping from the signal space into the price space is not ”one-to-one” and thus not
invertible. This can be thought of as the informed agents having two different demand
schedules for each realization of the signal, depending on the signal type. The uninformed
do not know with which of the two demand schedules of the informed they are compet-
ing. It is intuitively reasonable that a high-quality signal should not support the same
price as a low-quality signal, although they might have the same numeric value. This
mechanism is independent of noise trader demand. As long as the uninformed agents are
unable to somehow infer the state of the economy, the price system is not fully revealing
in the classical notion.3 However, if noise traders’ demand were public knowledge, the
uninformed could trick the system by playing a clever strategy. They could simply place
a market order and ask exactly their relative share of the observed noise trader demand.
As the proportion of informed and uninformed agents is common knowledge, such a strat-
egy is feasible. Doing so would implicitly force the informed agents to clear the market
by absorbing their relative share of aggregate demand. The resulting equilibrium would
support the full information price by applying the informed agents’ price schedule and
imposing its corresponding price for the respective demand. The information asymme-
try in the economy would not be material for the uninformed agents as the information
3Fully revealing in the classical sense means that the uninformed can infer the signal value from
simply observing price by inverting the price function (Vives, 2008).
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problem could be bypassed by applying this simple trick. Completely prohibiting agents
from placing market orders and forcing them to submit demand schedules would be the
only way in which this mechanism could be avoided. However, every market order could
be framed as a demand schedule that makes the restriction highly artificial and difficult
to justify. It is vital to know that the fact that aggregate demand must not be known to
the uninformed agent is not to prevent the price system from being fully revealing but
rather to motivate the uninformed to somehow evaluate and utilize the existing funda-
mental information in the economy instead of freeriding on the informed agents’ demand
schedule.
However, given the described setting, it is not trivial to draw inference from the price
system or other statistics of the economy. The signal structure— with two uncertainty
regimes—not only breaks apart the one-to-one mapping between price and the expected
pay off of the risky asset for the uninformed agents; moreover, it also makes it impos-
sible for the uninformed agents to pin down the price function a priori. This limitation
translates to the fact that the uninformed agents’ posterior beliefs are not specified and
the REE has no tractable closed-form solution. Thus, simply relying on price is insuffi-
cient for the uninformed agents to determine their optimal strategy. Facing this severe
problem, the uninformed are left with two possibilities: first, they can always decide
to ignore the potential information inherited in the price system and submit a demand
schedule based on their unconditional expectations or even remain completely away from
the market; or second, the uninformed could try to utilize their information set. In order
to draw inference from the price system, they have to somehow pin down the mapping
between the price and expected pay off before they enter the market and submit their
demand schedules. This set of options translates into four intuitive strategies that the
uninformed could think of.
1. unconditional strategy {Un} The uninformed agents do not try to infer information
from the price system and simply optimize given their unconditional expectations.
2. conservative strategy H The uninformed agents behave as if the signal would al-
ways be drawn from the distribution with the higher variance, regardless which
distribution the actual signal comes from.
3. progressive strategy L The uninformed agents act as if the signal would always be
drawn from the distribution with the low-variance, regardless which distribution
the actual signal comes from.
4. mixed strategies Mx The uninformed make use of their knowledge about the prob-
ability of the two different uncertainty regimes and play a mixed strategy by ran-
domizing over the possible uncertainty regimes with the respective probabilities.
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A strategy is said to be feasible if its expected utility over final wealth exceeds the
utility of the uninformed when staying at home and not participating in the market. In
this case of non-attendance, the informed agents would absorb all noise trader demand
and the uninformed would not enter the market. At the end of the period, they would
be left with the utility over their initial wealth. Hence, the expected utility of the unin-
formed has to exceed their final utility over their initial wealth. The mixed strategy can
be ruled out a priori as it is by definition a linear combination of strategies two and three
and thus always dominated by the better of the two strategies.
We solve for equilibrium in the standard five-step approach outlined in section 2.1
above based on the uninformed agents’ beliefs implied by their strategy. First, we propose
a conjecture of the price function. Second, we derive beliefs of the agents given the
conjectured price function as well as the private signal. Third, we derive the optimal
demand of the risky asset for the different agents, given their information sets. Fourth,
we impose market clearing and solve for price. Finally, we impose rationality by matching
the coefficients of the proposed price function with the price function derived in step four.
3 A Static benchmark model
In this section, we present a simple static model with only one trading period that high-
lights the main mechanisms at work in the economy when introducing a heterogeneous
signal structure.
3.1 The Environment
Consider an economy with two kinds of assets: a risk-free and a risky asset. The risk-
free asset has a price normalized to one and a pay off of R. The risky asset has a pay
off of θ and is distributed N (θˆ, σ2θ). There exist three different groups of agents. A
continuum of two ex-ante identical risk-averse agents with common risk aversion α and
CARA utility over wealth at the liquidation date t = 2, U(W2) = −e−αW . The risk-averse
agents differ along their information sets. A fraction λ of the continuum of risk-averse
agents—the informed agents—receive a signal Si with i ∈ {H,L} about the true value
of θ. The two possible noisy signals, Si with i ∈ {H,L}, about the true value of θ are
SH = θ + H and SL = θ + L, and they differ in their noise term, . Both noise terms
are normally distributed with mean zero, but have different variances σ2H and σ
2
L
. Their
relationship is restricted by the inequality σ2H > σ
2
L
. This implies that SL is a more
valuable signal than SH . It has higher precision and hence incorporates less uncertainty.
The informed agents always observe only one signal, either SH or SL with probability
p and 1 − p, respectively. However, they know whether the signal that they observe is
9
t0 t1 t2
Informed agents
receive their signal
noistraders’ demand
realizes
Agents trade
competitively
Payoff is realized
Figure 1: The time line shows the sequence of events in the model. At t = 0, the informed agents
receive their private signal Si. In the next step at t = 1, financial markets open, noise traders enter and
risk-averse agents trade competitively. Uncertainty is resolved at t = 3 and the pay off of the risky asset
θ materializes
SH or SL. The remaining fraction, (1 − λ), of the risk-averse agents do not receive any
further information about θ and are hence called the uninformed agents. Furthermore,
there is a group of noise traders who do not maximize their utility but trade for reasons
outside of the model. Their demand typically stems from information that is not of
common interest, such as from their need to hedge against endowment shocks or private
investment opportunities in an incomplete market setting (Brunnermeier, 2005). Some
models also work with the assumption of random aggregate demand, which is technically
identical to the noise trader assumption. In order to be consistent throughout this paper,
we stick to the notion of noise trader demand.4. The noise traders’ demand per trading
sequence is denoted by u and normally distributed with mean zero and variance σ2u. It
enters the market in period t = 1. The uninformed agents know neither the exact value
of Si nor which kind of signal, SH or SL the informed agents have received. Furthermore,
they are unaware of the realization of noise traders’ demand u. However, they can use all
public information to make inference. All probability distributions and other parameters
of the model are common knowledge. One trading sequence has three dates t ∈ {0, 1, 2}.
At t = 0, the informed agents receive their signal Si with i ∈ {H,L} and noise traders’
demand, u realizes. At t = 1, financial markets open, the noise traders enter the market
and the informed and uninformed agents trade competitively. At the final date, t = 2 the
risky asset pays its liquidating dividend. Figure 1 shows a timeline of the trade protocol.
Signal structure
The terminal value of the risky asset is given by θ ∼ N (θˆ, σ2θ). The informed traders
observe one of two possible noisy signals Si with i ∈ {H,L} of the terminal value of the
risky asset with probability p and 1−p, respectively. According to this setup, the signals
4The assumption of liquidity or noise traders who trade for reasons outside of the model and do
not optimize their utility is common in this literature. For a detailed discussion of possible reasons why
liquidity traders trade as well as an examination of the distinction between information of common versus
private interest, see Brunnermeier (2001) or O’hara (1995). Furthermore, it is possible to rationalize noise
traders as risk-averse hedgers. For a detailed analysis of the topic, see Manzano and Vives (2011) and
Medran and Vives (2004)
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follow a normal mixture distribution.
f(S) = pfSH (S) + (1− p)fSL(S) (3)
The components of the mixture distribution are defined as follows
SL = θ + L L ∼ N (0, σ2L) and hence SL ∼ N (θˆ, σ2θ + σ2L)
SH = θ + H H ∼ N (0, σ2H ) and hence SH ∼ N (θˆ, σ2θ + σ2H ),
(4)
with σ2H > σ
2
L
. θ and SL as well as θ and SH are distributed bivariate normal N ∼
(µSL ,ΣSL) and N ∼ (µSH ,ΣSH ), with
µSL = µSH =
(
θˆ
θˆ
)
ΣSL =
(
σ2θ σ
2
θ
σ2θ σ
2
θ + σ
2
L
)
ΣSH =
(
σ2θ σ
2
θ
σ2θ σ
2
θ + σ
2
H
)
Given the above distributions, one can calculate the values of E[θ|SH ], V ar[θ|SH ], E[θ|SL]
and V ar[θ|SL].5
E[θ|SL] = θˆ + σ
2
θ
σ2θ + σ
2
L︸ ︷︷ ︸
FL
(SL − θˆ) and V ar[θ|SL] = σ2θ −
σ4θ
σ2θ + σ
2
L
=
σ2θσ
2
L
σ2θ + σ
2
L
E[θ|SH ] = θˆ + σ
2
θ
σ2θ + σ
2
H︸ ︷︷ ︸
FH
(SH − θˆ) and V ar[θ|SH ] = σ2θ −
σ4θ
σ2θ + σ
2
H
=
σ2θσ
2
H
σ2θ + σ
2
H
3.2 Optimization of the agents
This chapter guides to the optimization problem faced by the different agents and provides
a first intuition of the signal structure’s implications on the optimization mechanics of
competitive rational expectations models.
The Agent’s budget constraint
Each of risk-averse agent is endowed with an initial wealth, W0, which he can invest in
the two different kinds of assets. Because a CARA investor’s demand is independent of
initial wealth, the actual amount of W0 does not influence the economics of the model. Pt
is the price of the risky asset in period t. The price of the risk-free asset is normalized to
one for all periods. Without loss of generality, the pay off of the risk-free asset R is also
assumed to be one throughout the paper. Each unit of the risky asset has a pay off of θ
5The results are derived applying the projection theorem for jointly normal variables.
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”dollars” at the end of the period. A ∈ {I, U} stands for the informed I or uninformed
U agent. Dt,A is agent A’s position in the risk-free asset at time t and Xt,A agent A’s
demand of the risky asset in period t. The initial budget constraint writes
W0,A = D1,A + P1X1,A. (5)
The wealth of the agent in period one in terms of pay off is given by
W1,A = RD1,A + θX1,A. (6)
Replacing the demand for the risky asset D1,A and expressing W1,A in terms of W0,A, the
final wealth of the agents is
W1,A = RW0,A + (θ −RP )X1,A. (7)
As already mentioned, all agents have the same utility function over final wealth V (W1,A)
of the CARA class,
V (W1,A) = −e−αW1,A , α > 0,
where α is the coefficient of absolute risk aversion. Each agent desires maximizing his
expected utility conditional on his information set.
Informed Agent
The informed trader maximizes his expected utility conditional on his information set,
F I = {Si}, which comprises the realization of the signal, Si, with i ∈ {H,L}
E[V (W1I)|Si] = E[−e−αW1I |Si]. (8)
Knowing the distribution of SH and SL, W1I is normally distributed conditional on the
respective Signal. Using log normal properties 6, we can rewrite equation 8 as
E[V (W1I)|Si] = −exp(−α(E[W1I |Si]− α
2
V ar[W1I |Si])). (9)
Given the properties of exponential utility, E[V (W1I)|Si] is maximized by maximizing
E[W1I |Si]− α
2
V ar[W1I |Si]. (10)
6If ln(x) ∼ N (µx, σ2x), then E[ex] = eµ+
1
2σ
2
12
Plugging in W1I from equation 7 yields
E[W1I |Si] = RW0I + (E[θ|Si]−RP )XI,i (11)
V ar[W1I |Si] = X2I,iV ar[θ|Si]. (12)
Equations 11 and 12 are due to the fact that W0I and R are known when the agent
conducts his optimization. P is treated as if it is known, as the informed agent submits
a complete demand schedule rather than a single order. He actually places his demand
for each possible price. The optimization problem of the informed agent writes
max
XI,i>0
RW0I + (E[θ|Si]−RP )XI,i − α
2
X2I,iV ar[θ|Si]. (13)
The resulting FOC is
E[θ|Si]−RP − αXI,iV ar[θ|Si] = 0, (14)
and informed demand is given by
XI,i =
E[θ|Si]−RP
α ∗ V ar[θ|Si] . (15)
Uninformed agent
The general mechanism of the optimization of the uninformed agents is independent of
their beliefs and hence the strategy they are playing. Essentially, it always follows the
same principles. The uninformed agents do not observe the signal, nor do they know the
specific distribution that it comes from. However, they know that there is a signal and
that it has to be drawn from one of two possible components of a mixture distribution
with known parameters. Furthermore, they understand how the demand of the informed
is affected by the signal. The uninformed will capitalize these insights to infer some
indication about the liquidation value of the asset, given the price that they observe.
For this purpose, they have to conjecture a price function based on their information set,
FU . When the uninformed conduct their optimization, besides price, P , they always have
access to signed trading volume. The latter denotes the net order flow of the informed and
noise traders (combined demand of the informed and noise traders). This information is
available, as it is always possible for the uninformed to check the aggregate position in the
order book. Signed trading volume is defined as υi = λ
E[θ|Si]−RPθ
α∗V ar[θ|Si] − u. For mathematical
convenience and in line with the literature, we introduce another variable called adjusted
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volume, νi, a simple transformation of signed volume.
7 In the setup of this paper, adjusted
volume crucially depends on the strategy of the uninformed and whether their strategy
matches the true signal state i, or not. The strategy of the uninformed is indicated by
j, with j ∈ {Un,H,L}. We compute adjusted volume by starting with υi, subtracting
the mean exogenous supply uˆ, which in our case is zero, multiplying the result by the
constant
α∗V ar[θ|Sj ]
λ
, which depends on the strategy of the uninformed and adding the
price Pλ,ij.
8
With Pλ,ij denoting the equilibrium price of the risky asset for a given fraction of
informed agents λ, a given signal i and a strategy played by the uninformed j, the
adjusted volume that the uninformed base their decision on is defined as
νji =
V ar[θ|Sj]
V ar[θ|Si] (E[θ|Si]− Pλ,ij)−
α ∗ V ar[θ|Sj]
λ
(u− uˆ) + Pλ,ij. (16)
If the true state of the signal regime coincides with the strategy of the uninformed, i = j,
in the following adjusted volume will be defined as νi and takes the form as in Grossman
and Stiglitz (1980) and Breon-Drish (2015) given by
νji = νi = E[θ|Si]−
α ∗ V ar[θ|Si]
λ
(u− uˆ). (17)
According to 17, conditioning uninformed beliefs on price is equivalent to conditioning
uninformed beliefs on a linear function of the signal S and aggregate demand u only. If
the true state of the signal regime does not match the action of the uninformed, i 6= j,
this is no longer true and adjusted volume is given by
νji =
V ar[θ|Sj]
V ar[θ|Si]E[θ|Si]−
α ∗ V ar[θ|Sj]
λ
(u− uˆ) +
(
V ar[θ|Si]− V ar[θ|Sj]
V ar[θ|Si]
)
Pλ,ij. (18)
It is easy to see that νji can always be framed solely in terms of νiandPλ,ij, using ν
j
i =
νi + (ν
j
i − νi)
νji = νi +
V ar[θ|Sj]− V ar[θ|Si]
V ar[θ|Si] (νi − Pλ,ij). (19)
Knowing the distributional assumptions on Si and u, one can work out the exact distri-
bution of νi as well as the joint distribution of νi and θ. A detailed description of the
distributions is given in appendix A.1. Furthermore, ν inherits the mixture structure of
7The variable ωλ in the original model of Grossman and Stiglitz (1980) is nothing but adjusted trading
volume.
8In this setting, signed volume is informationally equivalent to observing price and provides no addi-
tional information. Although more general settings exist, signed volume may enhance the information
contained in price. See Breon-Drish (2015) for a more detailed elaboration on the issue.
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S. Each value of signed trading volume, υi can potentially cause two different values of
adjusted volume, νji depending on the strategy of the uninformed and the signal type
SH or SL. Each of the two signal values gives rise to a different realization of adjusted
volume.
The uninformed agent conducts his maximization based on his information set comprising
adjusted volume as well as price, FU = {νji , Pλ,ij}.
E[V (W1U)|νji , Pλ,ij] = E[−e−αW1U |νji , Pλ,ij], (20)
Given that θ, W and νi are normal and ν
j
i can be always written as a function of νi and
Pλ,ij, the conditional distribution of W1U given ν
j
i and Pλ,ij is also normal. Therefore,
expected utility can be written
E[V (W1U)|νji , Pλ,ij] = −exp(−α(E[W1U |νji , Pλ,ij]−
α
2
V ar[W1U |νji , Pλ,ij])). (21)
The above equation is maximized by maximizing
E[W1U |νji , Pλ,ij]−
α
2
V ar[W1U |νji , Pλ,ij], (22)
resulting in the maximization problem of
max
XU>0
RW0U + (E[θ|νji , Pλ,ij]−RP )XU −
α
2
X2UV ar[θ|νji , Pλ,ij]. (23)
The FOC is given by
E[θ|νji , Pλ,ij]−RP − αXUV ar[θ|νji , Pλ,ij] = 0 (24)
and the demand of the uninformed writes
XU =
E[θ|νji , Pλ,ij]−RPλ,ij
α ∗ V ar[θ|νji , Pλ,ij]
. (25)
In this paragraph, we show that the general mechanism of the optimization of the unin-
formed agents is independent of their beliefs and hence the strategy that they are playing.
Like the informed agent, the uninformed knows W0I and R and acts as if he knew Pλ,ij,
when conducting his optimization. Due to the CARA utility structure, uninformed de-
mand is independent of the initial endowment.
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3.3 Equilibrium price
The maximization reveals that the demand function of the informed depends on the
signal regime, while the demand function of the uninformed agents additionally depends
on their strategy. The demand functions write
XI =
E[θ|Si]− Pλ,ij
α ∗ V ar[θ|Si] and XU =
E[θ|νji , Pλ,ij]− Pλ,ij
α ∗ V ar[θ|νji , Pλ,ij]
. (26)
Again, i denotes the actual signal regime and j indicates the strategy of the uninformed
agents. We imply market clearing with λ being the fraction of informed and (1− λ) the
fraction of uninformed agents such that the demand of the risky asset equals supply
λXI + (1− λ)XU = u. (27)
Substituting 26 into 27 yields
λ
E[θ|Si]− Pλ,ij
α ∗ V ar[θ|Si] + (1− λ)
E[θ|νji , Pλ,ij]− Pλ,ij
α ∗ V ar[θ|νji , Pλ,ij]
= u. (28)
Solving 28 for Pλ,ij, if i = j yields
Pλ;i,j=i = Pλ,i =
λ
αV ar[θ|Si]E[θ|Si]− u+
(1− λ)
αV ar[θ|νi]E[θ|νi]
λ
αV ar[θ|Si] +
(1− λ)
αV ar[θ|νi]
(29)
which can be rewritten as a linear function of νi
Pλ,i =
λ
αV ar[θ|Si]νi +
(1− λ)
αV ar[θ|νi]E[θ|νi]
λ
αV ar[θ|Si] +
(1− λ)
αV ar[θ|νi]
. (30)
Solving 28 for Pλ,ij, if i 6= j yields
Pλ;i,j =
λ
αV ar[θ|Si]E[θ|Si]− u+
(1− λ)
αV ar[θ|νj] [θˆ +Gj(1 +
V ar[θ|Sj]− V ar[θ|Si]
V ar[θ|Si] )νi − θˆ)]
λ
αV ar[θ|Si] +
(1− λ)
αV ar[θ|νj] (1 +Gj(
V ar[θ|Sj]− V ar[θ|Si]
V ar[θ|Si] )
.
(31)
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Rewritten as a function of νi, we get
Pλ;i,j =
λ
αV ar[θ|Si]νi +
(1− λ)
αV ar[θ|νj] [θˆ +Gj(1 +
V ar[θ|Sj]− V ar[θ|Si]
V ar[θ|Si] )νi − θˆ)]
λ
αV ar[θ|Si] +
(1− λ)
αV ar[θ|νj] (1 +Gj(
V ar[θ|Sj]− V ar[θ|Si]
V ar[θ|Si] )
(32)
One can infer from equation 15 that the demand of the informed is not unique in S, but
rather can have two different values depending on i. This spills over to signed trading
volume υ and materializes in the two different values of adjusted volume described by 17
and 18 for each observation of υ. According to equations 30 and 32, either of the possible
νs implies a different price. Hence, the mapping from S to P , P (S) is not single valued
and P (S)−1 does not exist. Given this structure, it is impossible for the uninformed to
infer the signal regime by simply observing price.
Solving the model for the uninformed playing the conservative strategy (H)
In this paragraph, we work through the above-described mechanics in further detail and
try to give some intuition by solving the model for the scenario when the uninformed
plays the conservative strategy H. Applying this strategy, the uninformed agent acts as
if the signal would only be drawn from the mixture component with the high-variance;
hence, as if SH were the only possible signal in the economy. If the true signal corresponds
to SH , the uninformed gets everything right and the resulting equilibrium is analogous
to that in Grossman and Stiglitz (1980). The economy is described by the following
equations:
Signed volume is given by
υ = λ
E[θ|SH ]−RPλ,H
α ∗ V ar[θ|SH ] − u, (33)
adjusted volume by
νH = E[θ|SH ]− α ∗ V ar[θ|SH ]
λ
(u− uˆ). (34)
The equilibrium price is
Pλ,H =
λ
αV ar[θ|SH ]νH +
(1− λ)
αV ar[θ|νH ]E[θ|νH ]
λ
αV ar[θ|SH ] +
(1− λ)
αV ar[θ|νH ]
. (35)
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However, if the true signal is SL and the uninformed acts as if the signal were SH , he
makes a mistake. The mistake materializes by the conversion from signed volume to
adjusted volume. Adjusted volume in case of the true signal is SL, but the uninformed
plays SH , which is labeled as ν
H
L and is defined as
νHL =
V ar[θ|SH ]
V ar[θ|SL] (E[θ|SL]− Pλ;L,H)−
α ∗ V ar[θ|SH ]
λ
(u− uˆ). (36)
Knowing νL = E[θ|SL]− α∗V ar[θ|SL]λ (u− uˆ) and V ar[θ|SH ] > V ar[θ|SL], it is obvious that
νHL > νL. Thus, ν
H
L can be framed in terms of νL, as ν
H
L = νL+(ν
H
L −νL). Using equation
19,
νHL = νL +
V ar[θ|SH ]− V ar[θ|SL]
V ar[θ|SL] (νL − Pλ;L,H). (37)
The resulting equilibrium price according to 32 is
Pλ;L,H =
λ
αV ar[θ|SL]νL +
(1− λ)
αV ar[θ|νH ] [θˆ +GH(1 +
V ar[θ|SH ]− V ar[θ|SL]
V ar[θ|SL] )νL − θˆ)]
λ
αV ar[θ|SL] +
(1− λ)
αV ar[θ|νH ] (1 +GH(
V ar[θ|SH ]− V ar[θ|SL]
V ar[θ|SL] )
.
(38)
The mistake of the uninformed has two direct implications on price. First, the signal,
νHL , upon which the conditional expectation is based is larger than it would have been
in a setting without asymmetric information. Second, the update factor, GH , is smaller
than it should be due to the overestimated variance of the signal. These two affects work
opposite to each other but will never offset each other exactly as the effect owing to GH
is stronger. This gives rise to the price effects of the model stated in theorem 4.1.
3.4 Utility of the agents in equilibrium
The main emphasis of this paper is on studying the price dynamics incurred by heteroge-
neous information. We do not primarily focus on the analysis of potential equilibria in the
information market, the difference in utility between the informed and uninformed agents
or the price of information implied by this difference in utility. We mainly investigate the
utility of the uninformed agents—especially the difference in utility—if the uninformed
face a world with two different levels of uncertainty versus a world with only one level
of uncertainty. Furthermore, it is investigated how the different strategies influence the
utility of the uninformed. On can think of this as the price of information having two
components. First, the difference between knowing and not knowing the exact value of
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the signal, hence reflecting the classical information asymmetry between the informed
and uninformed agents referred to in the literature. Second, the difference in utility if the
uninformed agents face two different uncertainty regimes and do not know which one they
are currently in compared to a situation with only one uncertainty regime. In the latter,
the uninformed know the prevailing uncertainty regime by construction. The following
analysis concentrates on the second component of uncertainty as it determines which
strategy the uninformed will play. Nevertheless, for completion we start by investigating
the utility of the informed agent.
Utility of informed agents
To calculate the utility of the informed agent, we start at the basis of the utility of the
uninformed and calculate the ex-ante expected utility of being informed given the in-
formation set of the uninformed. This approach comes with two major benefits: first,
it simplifies the comparison between the utility of the informed and uninformed; and
second, it makes the calculations technically more tractable. The detailed calculations
are relegated to appendix A.2.
According to equation 9, the utility of the informed agent writes
E[V (W1I)|Si] = −exp
[
− α(E[W1I |Si]− α
2
V ar[W1I |Si]
)]
(39)
with W1I being
W1I = RW0I + (θ −RP )XI,i,
Using 39 and plugging in W1I and XI,i after simplifying, one obtains
E[V (W1I)|Si] = −exp
[
− αRW0I
]
∗ exp
[
− 1
2
(E[θ|Si]−RPλ;i,j)2
V ar[θ|Si]
]
. (40)
As the first part on the right hand side of equation 40 is independent of the signal, the
second term has to be key. To determine the ex-ante utility of the informed, we evaluate
the expectation given adjusted volume
E [E[V (W1I)|Si]|νi] = V (RW0I) ∗ E
[
exp
(
− 1
2
(E[θ|Si]−RPλ;i,j)2
V ar[θ|Si]
)∣∣∣∣νi]. (41)
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After some algebra, the solution to equation 41 is given by
E [E[V (W1I)|Si]|νi] = V (RW0I)
√
V ar[θ|Si]
V ar[θ|νi] ∗ exp
[
−
(
E[θ|νi]−RPλ;i,j
)2
2V ar[θ|νi]
]
. (42)
Notice that CARA utility is negative. Hence, the smaller the ratio
√
V ar[θ|Si]
V ar[θ|νi] , the higher
the utility of the informed. Equation 42 states that the difference between informed and
uninformed utility induced by knowing the value of the signal is governed by the ratio
of conditional variances, which can be interpreted as the relative value of the quality of
information. The more precise the signal of the informed compared to the information
carried in adjusted volume, the greater its informational advantage. As the informed do
not know a priori which signal regime will materialize, their expected utility is given by
a weighted average of both regimes governed by the mixture weights. E
[
E[V (W1I)|S]
]
,
combined with the facts on normal mixtures yields
E
[
E[V (W1I)|S]
∣∣νi] = p ∗ E[E[V (W1I)|SH ]∣∣νi]+ (1− p)E[E[V (W1I)|SL]∣∣νi] (43)
which results in the expression for overall utility of the informed being
E [E[V (W1I)|S]] = V (RW0I)
(
p ·
√
V ar[θ|SH ]
V ar[θ|νH ] ∗ E
[
exp
[
−
(
E[θ|νH ]−RPλ;H,j
)2
2V ar[θ|νH ]
]]
+ (1− p) ·
√
V ar[θ|SL]
V ar[θ|νL] ∗ E
[
exp
[
−
(
E[θ|νL]−RPλ;L,j
)2
2V ar[θ|νL]
]])
.
(44)
Utility of the uninformed agents
Calculating the utility of the uninformed agents, we approach as follows. We define the
utility of the uninformed without uncertainty regarding the signal regime as ”first best”.
This constitutes the max utility level that the uninformed can reach without knowing
the signal. Subsequently, we compare the different strategies with the ”first-best” level
and each other to identify dominant strategies that are feasible for the uninformed. It is
always possible to frame the utility of the uninformed as a function of νi and θˆ, enabling
a closed-form solution and making the calculations much easier to interpret. The ex-ante
utility of the uninformed in the respective uncertainty regime can be calculated along the
following steps. The detailed calculations are relegated to appendix A.3.
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The expected utility of the uninformed agent is defined by
E[V (W1U)|νi] = −exp
[
− α(E[W1U |νi]− α
2
V ar[W1U |νi]
)]
(45)
with W1U being
W1U = RW0U + (θ −RP )XU ,
Using 45, plugging in W1U and XU and simplifying defines expected utility as
E [E[V (W1U )|νi]] = −exp [−αRW0U ] ∗
E
[
exp
[
−E[θ|ν
j
i , Pλ;i,j ]−RPλ;i,j
α ∗ V ar[θ|νji , Pλ;i,j ]
(
(E[θ|νi]−RPλ;i,j)− 1
2
(
E[θ|νji , Pλ;i,j ]−RPλ;i,j
) V ar [θ∣∣νi]
V ar[θ|νji , Pλ;i,j ]
)]]
(46)
The expression in the first line of 46 is a constant and in the second line the term
in the exponential can be rewritten as a linear function of (νi − θˆ)2. Hence, expected
utility of the uninformed can be calculated analytically and in closed form, by plugging
in Pλ;i,j, E[θ|νji , Pλ;i,j], E[θ|νi], V ar[θ|νji , Pλ;i,j] and V ar
[
θ
∣∣νi] and realizing the fact that
the resulting expression follows a central chi-square distribution with one df. For i = j,
46 reduces to the standard form given by
E[V (W1U)|νi] = V (RW0U) ∗ exp
[
− 1
2
(E[θ|νi]−RPλ;i)2
V ar[θ|νi]
]
. (47)
Difference in utility
As the informed agents receive a signal and know the uncertainty regime due to their
informational advantage, their expected utility exceeds the expected utility of the unin-
formed. In order to calculate the difference in utility, we introduce a new variable called
E[V (Waux)|νi]. It describes the expected utility of the uninformed if they were informed
about the signal regime, but the price in the economy would still allow for the possibility
that the strategy of the uninformed and the true state of the signal do not match. This
allows splitting the connection between information and utility into two components: one
regarding the value of the observed signal and the second regarding the advantage implied
by knowing the signal regime. The new variable is defined as
E[V (Waux)|νi] = eαRV (RW0I) ∗ exp
[
−
(
E[θ|νi]−RPλ;i,j
)2
2V ar[θ|νi]
]
. (48)
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The difference in expected utility between the informed and uninformed agents is then
calculated with the help of the new variable according to
E[V (W1I)]− E[V (W1U)] = E[V (W1I)]− E[V (Waux)] + (E[V (Waux)]− E[V (W1U)])
(49)
For i = j, E[V (W1U)] = E[V (Waux)] and the utility difference between informed and
uninformed is mainly governed by the ratio
√
V ar[θ|Si]
V ar[θ|νi] . However, if i 6= j, the utility
difference between the informed and uninformed incorporates the two aforementioned
components: first, the ratio
√
V ar[θ|Si]
V ar[θ|νi] , which governs the informational advantage of the
signal Si compared to the price system νi if there were no uncertainty concerning the
signal regime; and second, the difference between E[V (Waux)]−E[V (W1U)], which takes
into account the loss in utility of the uninformed for not knowing the uncertainty regime
and hence making a strategic mistake when updating conditional on the adjusted volume
that they observe. Pλ;i,j affects both elements of the utility calculation and guarantees a
further distinction from the standard results of the literature.9
3.5 General equilibrium
Next we determine the optimal strategy of the uninformed facing the described economy
and the set of possible actions defined in section 2.2. Furthermore, we investigate whether
the actions of the uninformed lead to a REE that meets the conditions stated in equations
1 and 2 and analyze the main properties of the potential equilibrium.
Theorem 3.1. There always exists a noisy REE that fulfills conditions 1 and 2 contingent
on the set of possible strategies described
1. in which the uninformed agent plays either strategy L or H
2. there exists a threshold level p∗ as a function of the parameters of the model p∗ =
f(σL , σH , σθ, σu, α, λ) with the domain
1
2
< p∗ < 1 ∀ λ < 1
2
, which determines
the optimal strategy for the uninformed. It defines an optimal strategy for any
parametrization of the economy
3. if p < p∗ it is optimal for the uninformed to play strategy L
4. if p∗ < p it is optimal for the uninformed to play strategy H
Proof. We prove the above theorem in two steps. First, we show that playing strategy
H is always superior compared with staying out of the market or participating without
9This setup would also allow solving for an equilibrium in the information market. However, as
already mentioned, this is beyond the scope of this paper.
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trying to learn from the price system. Next, we consider the expected utility of the
uninformed for both strategies and demonstrate that the two functions intersect only
once. Finally, equating the expected utility of both strategies yields the expression for p∗
in terms of the parameters of the model. For the detailed proof, see appendix A.4
It seems reasonable that it is beneficial to use information that one possesses but is
not 100 percent sure about its quality cautiously rather than not using it at all. Thus,
the first part of the theorem is in line with intuition. However, part two appears to
be not as obvious. While it seems logical for very high values of p that strategy H
dominates strategy L and vice versa, determining the critical values of p ex ante by
economic intuition is not straightforward. One possible way of reasoning is along the
lines of risk aversion. Confronted with information of rather unknown quality, utilizing
this information more cautiously should accommodate the general idea of risk aversion.
This argues in favor of playing strategy H. Accordingly, the uninformed get everything
right in the high signal regime. In the low signal regime, they base their decisions on the
assumption of higher uncertainty and thus discount their information at a higher rate than
required. This can simply be interpreted as being overly cautious. Against the backdrop
of this line of reasoning, we expect the optimal region supporting strategy H to be larger
than that in support of strategy L materializing in the fact of p∗ < 1
2
. However, looking
at theorem 3.1, this is not true. The parameter space supporting L strictly exceeds the
parameter space supporting H. It emerges that the optimal behavior of an agent is not
to be cautious, but rather to minimize his relative informational disadvantage compared
to the informed agent. As the value of information decreases with its variance, the utility
that the informed can extract from his information in the high-variance regime is smaller
than in the low-variance regime. Therefore, the informed is able to more efficiently exploit
his informational advantage given the low-variance regime. Thus, it is much costlier for
the uninformed to make a mistake in the low uncertainty regime compared to the high
uncertainty regime, as the informed is able to capitalize on the mistake of the uninformed
more aggressively. In everyday language, this translates into the desire that it is beneficial
to get the high impact things right while being more laissez-faire with the minor issues.
The low-variance regime is more efficient in the way that the informational disadvantage
of the uninformed is higher. The high-variance regime is more forgiving when making a
mistake.
Numerical comparative statics
In this section, we discuss the consequences of perturbations of the model parameters on
the agents’ utility and their optimal strategies. The parameters of the model can roughly
be divided into two groups: one having primarily a level effect and influencing both
strategies in the same direction with rather equal strength, and the other mainly governing
23
0-plane ΔVU 0-plane ΔVU
Figure 2: Development of the utility difference of the uninformed between the two possible strategies
V (UL)− V (UH) with respect to changes λ and p for two different levels of variance in the noise term of
the high-variance signal SH , namely σH = 2 and σH = 3. The value of the variance in the noise term
of the low-variance signal SL, namely σL and the values of σθ, σu as well as α are fixed at 1.
the difference between the two strategies and hence defining optimality, p∗. The factors
belonging to the latter group—hence primarily determining the utility difference between
the two strategies—are the variance of the noise terms of the signal, more precisely their
difference, σ2H −σ2L , and the variance of the pay off of the risky asset, σ2θ . Figure 2 shows
the utility difference of the informed agents between playing strategy L and strategy
H, V (WU,L) − V (WU,H) plotted against the horizontal zero-plane. The graph visualizes
the development of the utility difference given an increase in the difference of the signal
precision for all possible mixture weights p and different shares of informed agents λ. The
variance of the risky pay off, noise trading, risk aversion as well as the noise term of the
low-variance signal are held constant at 1, σ2u = 1, σ
2
θ = 1, σ
2
L
= 1 and α = 1. As long as
the red plane is below the gray, it is beneficial for the uninformed agent to play strategy
L. As soon as the red plane crosses the gray zero-plane from below, it is beneficial to
obey strategy H. Notice that due to CARA utility, the more negative the value in the
graph, the greater the advantage of playing strategy L and vice versa. One can clearly
infer from the two pictures that an increase in the variance of the noise term in the high-
variance regime ceteris paribus significantly increases the utility difference between the
two strategies and reduces the feasible region of strategy H, hence leading to increasing
values of p∗. The mechanism at hand is that an increase in the difference of signal noise
by increasing σH reduces the relative informational advantage of the informed in the
high-variance regime, while the situation in the low-variance regime remains unchanged.
This effects the utility difference between the two strategies in two ways: on the one hand,
when playing strategy H, the mistake in the low signal regime is more severe; and on
the other hand, the relative benefits of getting the signal right in the high signal regime
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0-plane ΔVU 0-plane ΔVU
Figure 3: Development of the utility difference of the uninformed between the two possible strategies
V (UL) − V (UH) with respect to changes λ and p for two different variance levels of the pay off of the
risky asset, σθ = 1 and σθ = 3. The values of the noise term in the high-variance regime is set to two,
σH = 2 and the values of σL , σu as well as α are fixed at 1.
have decreased as the overall quality of the signal has decreased. The opposite is true
for strategy L. Here, the benefits of getting the L signal right remain stable, while the
problem of making a mistake in the high-variance regime declines as the scenario as a
whole is less favorable for both informed as well as uninformed agents. These dynamics
yield the observed increase in the utility difference between the two strategies and the
decline in the feasible region of strategy H. Notice that the red area above the zero-plane
is significantly smaller in the right picture compared to the left.
The second main force driving the utility difference is the variance of the asset pay
off σ2θ . An increase in σ
2
θ ceteris paribus diminishes the difference in utility between the
two strategies. This development is depicted in figure 3 for σ2u = 1, σ
2
L
= 1, σ2H = 4 and
α = 1. With increasing σ2θ , signal noise implicitly decreases relative to the asset variance.
This constitutes nothing but a relative increase in signal quality in both signal regimes
with the relative difference between the regimes simultaneously decreasing. Therefore,
with increasing volatility in the asset pay off, both strategies kind of converge, the utility
difference declines and the feasible region of strategy H increases. The development is
nicely depicted by the increase of the red area above the zero-plane in the right graph of
figure 3 compared with the left.
The remaining variables can be attributed to group one. Their effect is depicted in
figure 4 using the overall utility of strategy L as an example. The left graph in figure
4 portrays the influence of an increase in noise trading on the overall utility of the un-
informed agents. The other parameters of the model are calibrated as σ2θ = 1, σ
2
L
= 1,
σ2H = 4 and α = 1. An increase in noise trading measured by an increase in σ
2
u theoreti-
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σu=1 σu=3 α=1 α=3
Figure 4: The left graph depicts the development of the utility level of the uninformed agents playing
strategy ”L” given an increase in the variance of noise trading from σu = 1 to σu = 3. The right
graph depicts the development of the utility level of the uninformed agents playing strategy ”L” given
an increase in risk aversion from α = 1 to α = 3. The values of the noise term in the high-variance
regime is set to two, σH = 2. All other parameters of the model σL , σθ are fixed at 1.
cally induces two effects: one on the utility difference between informed and uninformed
and the other on the overall utility of the uninformed. Concerning the former, it reduces
the general informativeness of the price system and hence increases the informational
advantage of the informed. However, overall it reduces the equilibrium price and thus
generally increases the utility of all agents in the economy. For the uninformed, the latter
effect more than overcompensates the decrease in the informativeness of the price system.
This can be thought of in two ways. The higher supply reduces the price and as noise
traders are not maximizing utility they thus kind of pay the bill in this economy. In turn,
the fraction of people who could be exploited by the maximizing agents increases. This
positive effect on the utility level shifts the utility plane downwards and is depicted by
the difference between the gray and the red plane in the left graph of figure 4. Remember
that due to CARA utility, the closer the planes are to zero, the higher the utility of the
uninformed agents.
Increasing risk aversion has a similar effect on overall utility. The right graph of figure
4 shows the development of utility for an increase in risk aversion from α = 1 to α = 2.
The rationale behind the presented dynamics is that the higher the risk aversion, the less
aggressively the informed agents exploit their informational advantage. Furthermore, the
certainty discount on the equilibrium price is higher, which in turn is positive for the
uninformed agents as a lower price ceteris paribus increases their overall utility. In both
cases, the level effects reduce the overall utility difference between the two strategies.
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t0 t1 t2 t3
Informed agents
receive their signal
1st half noistrader-
demand realizes
Agents trade
competitively
2nd half noistrader-
demand realizes
signal uncertaity
resolves
Agents trade
competitively
Payoff is realized
Figure 5: The timeline shows the sequence of events in the model. At t = 0, the informed agents receive
their private signal Si. At t = 1, the first half of noise traders enters the market and the agents trade
competitively. In the next step at t = 2, the uncertainty about the signal structure i = H/L is revealed,
the second half of noise traders enter the market and agents trade again. Uncertainty is resolved at t = 3
and the pay off of the risky asset θ materializes
4 The two-period market
In this section, we extend the static model of section 3 for an additional trading period
and examine the equilibrium implications as well as the resulting price dynamics.
4.1 Equilibrium in the two-period market
Paragraph 3 depicts and explains the basic mechanisms of the model. However, in order
to investigate price dynamics, one has to look at a model with more than one round of
trading. For tractability, we restrict our attention to the case with two trading periods.
This allows us to describe and analyze the underlying price dynamics given heterogeneous
information. The basic setting is not altered much. In the extended model, the uncer-
tainty regarding the signal regime is resolved after the first round of trading and financial
markets open for a second time. Furthermore, noise traders’ demand—still denoted by
u and normally distributed with mean zero and variance σ2u—enters the market by equal
parts in two steps. One trading sequence has four dates t ∈ {0, 1, 2, 3}. At t = 0, the
informed agents receive their signal Si with i ∈ {H,L} and noise traders’ demand, u
realizes. At t = 1, financial markets open, half of the noise traders enter the market and
the informed and uninformed agents trade competitively. At the second trading round,
t = 2 the true state of the signal is revealed to the uninformed agents, and markets open
again. The remaining half of the noise traders now enter the market and informed and
uninformed agents trade competitively given the new information set of the uninformed.
The informed agents do not receive any new information in the second round of trading.
At the final date, t = 3 the risky asset pays its liquidating dividend. Figure 5 shows a
timeline of the trade protocol.
No additional fundamental information regarding the pay off of the risky asset enters
the market as the informed agents do not receive an additional signal. Agents maximize
their expected end-of-period wealth W3 and due to CARA utility their wealth level—
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expected trading gain from period one—does not influence their optimization in period
two. Therefore, the optimization and hence the demand of informed agents does not
change in the two-period model as they face an identical information set in both periods.
Regarding the uninformed agents, the situation is considerably different: when the signal
regime is unveiled in period two, the information set of the uninformed is affected and
they incorporate the new information when conducting their optimization. Notice that
as they are optimizing end-of-period wealth W3, their optimal strategy in period one has
no implications on their optimal strategy in period two. Accordingly, the first-period
behavior of the uninformed does not influence their second-period choices. This is a very
nice property as it no longer requires solving the model backwards over two periods but
allows us to evaluate each period separately as if it were independent.
In the second round of trading, the signal regime is known to all agents. The equi-
librium solutions of the second trading period are given by the equations satisfying i = j
and fit a classical noisy REE for both uncertainty regimes.
4.2 Price dynamics
We know the properties of the equilibria in the two periods and the resulting market-
clearing equilibrium prices. The next result shows that the behavior of the equilibrium
prices from one period to another is systematic and crucially depends on the parametriza-
tion of the economy and hence the optimal strategy of the uninformed agents. Overall,
two distinct price patterns can be measured across the economy: on the one hand, the
economy exhibits momentum, which is triggered by the price movement when observing
a low-variance signal but the uninformed opts to see himself in a high-variance regime;
and on the other hand, the economy exhibits reversal triggered by the reaction of the
uninformed to high-variance signals when he opts to behave as if he were in a low-variance
world. There are admissible regions for over- as well as under-reaction patterns in this
economy depending on the parameters of the model. The bounds of these regions are
mainly governed by the difference in the information quality of the two different signals
and the variance of the risky asset. The exact results are stated in the next theorem.
Theorem 4.1. For each parametrization of the model, there exists a value p∗ that de-
termines whether the development of stock prices between the first and second round of
trading shows a momentum or reversal pattern.
1. If p < p∗ the uninformed agent plays strategy L and the economy is in the reversal
region;
• Whenever the signal regime is SH , |P1,SH | > |P2,SH | and
cor(∆P1,SH∆P2,SH ) < 0
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• The overall correlation of price changes between the periods is negative,
cor(∆P1∆P2) < 0
2. If p > p∗ the uninformed agent plays strategy H and the economy is in the momen-
tum region
• Whenever the signal regime is SL, |P1,SL| < |P2,SL| and
cor(∆P1,SL∆P2,SL) > 0
• the overall correlation of price changes between the periods is positive,
cor(∆P1∆P2) > 0
Proof. See Appendix A.5
The economic intuition underlying the price patterns is straightforward. Playing
strategy L, the price effect materializes in the presence of the high-variance regime. In
such a situation, the actual demand of the uninformed agents exceeds their optimal
demand in the prevailing signal regime. The over-reaction owing to a presumably high
signal quality shifts up the entire demand schedule of the uninformed, implying a higher
demand for each given price. Following the classical mechanics of markets, this excess
demand from one side directly translates into a higher market-clearing price in equilibrium
compared to a situation without uncertainty regarding the signal regime. As there is no
longer signal uncertainty in the second trading period, the over-reaction resolves, leading
to a price reversal to its efficient level. Given strategy H, the price effect follows a
signal realization from the low-variance regime and the mechanics are vice versa. The
uniformed underestimates the quality of his information and reacts too tentatively. The
resulting demand induced by the signal is too low, which results in a downward shift of
the entire demand schedule. It is easy to see that less demand from the uninformed yields
lower prices in equilibrium. The second-period demand will not suffer this bias and thus
exceeds the demand in the first period. This results in a higher market price, the initial
under-reaction is corrected and a momentum effect occurs.
These price patterns occur without inducing any behavioral biases on the uninformed.
As theorem 3.1 shows, the uninformed agents behave fully rationally given their infor-
mation set and possible choice of actions. They are completely aware of the described
mechanism, although ex-ante they are unable to anticipate its occurrence and hence
unable to avoid it.
Theorem 4.1 further states that each calibration supports either the over- or under-
reaction of prices. However, it is easy to extend the setting in a way that it generally
allows for both price patterns independent of the calibration of parameters. As soon
as the mixture probabilities are no longer fixed but are allowed to change over time, it
is possible to introduce both price patterns in the economy, as the realizations of the
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t0 t1 t2
Informed and
uninformd agents
receive their signal
Noistraders’ demand
realizes
Agents trade
competitively
Payoff is realized
Figure 6: The time line shows the sequence of events in the model when the uninformed receive
information about the value of the signal but not about its quality. At t = 0, the informed and uninformed
agents receive their private signal Si and S, respectively. In the next step at t = 1, financial markets
open, noise traders enter and risk-averse agents trade competitively based on their signals. Uncertainty
is resolved at t = 3 and the pay off of the risky asset θ materializes
mixture weights are common knowledge. Given situations in which the realization equals
p < p∗ reversal occurs and if p > p∗ prices exhibit a momentum pattern. Thus, even the
scope of the economy seems limited at first, it is easy to allow for both kinds of price
reaction without altering the intuition of the model.
Remark The assumption of the behavior of the noise traders as well as the fact that
the informed do not observe a second signal seems a little artificial. However, these
assumptions are not essential for the inherent dynamics of the model. The price effect
would still be existent but only on average and much more tedious to prove. Therefore,
I stick to the above outline, which also makes the basic dynamics of the model much
clearer.
5 The Extended model
In the following extension, we study the implications on the equilibrium if the uninformed
agents observe the realization of the signal but still remain uninformed regarding the
prevailing signal regime.
5.1 General setting
The setting is analogous to that in 3 with the only difference being that the uninformed
agents also get to know the realization of the signal Si. However, they do not know
whether the signal that they observe is SL or SH . Hence, they simply observe S without
having further information. The time line of events is very similar to that described in
chapter 3.1 and is given in figure 6
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Signal structure
The signal structure is equal to that described at the beginning of chapter 3, with the
only difference being that knowing the realization of the signal Si, the uniformed are now
able to make Bayesian inference regarding the probability of the prevailing uncertainty
regime. They can assign probabilities to the different mixture components—the part of
the distribution the signal comes from—and do not have to stick to the prior weights
of the mixture distribution. The prior distribution of S is given by equation 3. The
uninformed agents’ posterior distribution is given by
f(S) = ωLfSL(S) + ωHfSH (S), (50)
with the weights of the mixture after observing the realization of S being given according
to Bayes’ theorem and writing
ωH =
pfSH (S)
(1− p)fSL(S) + pfSH (S)
and ωL =
(1− p)fSL(S)
(1− p)fSL(S) + pfSH (S)
. (51)
ωL and ωH are the relative probabilities the observed Signal S can be attributed to SL
or SH .
5.2 Optimization and equilibrium demand
The optimization of the informed does not change as their information set is not affected
by the alterations in the setup of the economy. By contrast, the optimization of the unin-
formed differs due to their additional signal. The signal S is a superior statistic regarding
the future pay off of the risky asset compared to the adjusted volume or price. Hence, the
uninformed no longer try to draw any inference from price or adjusted volume, but con-
dition directly on the realization of the signal. Although the uninformed know the value
of S, the price system of the economy is not fully revealing as they still cannot observe
noise trader demand u. Informed demand is still camouflaged by the noise traders. Each
value of S can give rise to two different expressions of informed demand XI , depending
on the signal regime. One can think of this as a second layer of uncertainty, impeding
that the economy remains fully informationally efficient.
Optimization of the uninformed
The uninformed are optimizing their expected utility. Nevertheless, their ex-ante infor-
mation set is no longer empty, but rather contains the value of their signal, FU{S}. Thus,
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they condition their maximization on the signal S that they have observed.
E[V (W1U)|S] = E[−e−αW1U |S] (52)
As the uninformed agents do not know the detailed properties of the signal, they have to
update their beliefs about the signal type according to Bayes’ theorem, using the weights
defined in 51.
E[V (W1U)|S] = ωLE[−e−αW1U |SL] + ωHE[−e−αW1U |SH ] (53)
Given that a mixture distribution is a weighted sum of normals, the result for log normal
distributions can be used and the respective parts of the expected utility of the uninformed
agents can be written as
E[V (W1U)|SL] = −exp
(
−α
(
E[W1U |SL]− α
2
V ar[W1U |SL]
))
, (54)
and
E[V (W1U)|SH ] = −exp
(
−α
(
E[W1U |SH ]− α
2
V ar[W1U |SH ]
))
. (55)
Adding everything up, the expected utility of the uninformed given S writes
E[V (W1U)|S] =− ωL · exp
(
−α
(
E[W1U |SL]− α
2
V ar[W1U |SL]
))
− ωH · exp
(
−α
(
E[W1U |SH ]− α
2
V ar[W1U |SH ]
))
.
(56)
Substituting the expressions for E[W1U |SL], E[W1U |SH ], V ar[W1U |SL] and V ar[W1U |SH ],
one gets
E[V (W1U )|S] =− ωL · exp
(
−α
(
RW0U + (E[θ|SL]−RP )XU − αX
2
U
2
V ar[θ|SL]
))
− ωH · exp
(
−α
(
RW0U + (E[θ|SH ]−RP )XU − αX
2
U
2
V ar[θ|SH ]
))
.
(57)
The maximization problem of the uninformed agents and the corresponding FOC write
max
XU
− ωL · exp
(
−α
(
RW0U + (E[θ|SL]−RP )XU − αX
2
U
2
V ar[θ|SL]
))
− ωH · exp
(
−α
(
RW0U + (E[θ|SH ]−RP )XU − αX
2
U
2
V ar[θ|SH ]
))
.
(58)
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FOC:
0 = ωL · (α ((E[θ|SL]−RP )− αXUV ar[θ|SL])) exp (ΘSL)
+ ωH · (α ((E[θ|SH ]−RP )− αXUV ar[θ|SH ])) exp (ΘSH )
(59)
with
ΘSL = −α
(
RW0U + (E[θ|SL]−RP )XU − αX
2
U
2
V ar[θ|SL]
)
ΘSH = −α
(
RW0U + (E[θ|SH ]−RP )XU − αX
2
U
2
V ar[θ|SH ]
) (60)
The uninformed cannot distinguish the different signals’ regimes. Therefore, they are
unable to maximize their utility dependent on the respective signal regime, but rather
have to maximize over their expectation of the signal regime. They are searching for
an optimal demand given their signal, which fulfills optimality regardless of the signal
regime in place. Contrary to the informed agent, this translates into only one maximiza-
tion problem and one FOC. Unfortunately, the resulting expression for the FOC has no
analytical solution and can only be solved numerically.
Equilibrium demand
Despite the challenges posed above, it is possible to prove existence and characterize the
different features of the equilibrium in closed form. As this paper places its focus on
the price dynamics that exist in the market, a proof and characterization of equilibrium
should be sufficient. The following proposition postulates the existence of optimal demand
and pins down its most important characteristics.
Proposition 1.
1. There exists a unique XU that fulfills the conditions of optimal demand stated in 2.
2. For each signal, the optimal demand of the uninformed agent, XU , is situated within
a specified interval (
¯
X, X¯), with the demand of the informed agents XIH and XIL
being the boundaries of that interval.
3. For equilibrium demand, the following relations hold. XI,H > XU < XI,L,∀S > 0
and XI,L > XU < XI,H ,∀S < 0.
Proof. The proof of proposition 1 is organized in three parts. We first prove that the FOC
given by 59 is a continuous function, monotonically decreasing with XU . Second, we show
that optimal demand of the uninformed is bounded by the interval XU ∈ (
¯
X, X¯) with
the boundaries being XI,L and XI,H and FOC(
¯
X) < 0 and FOC(X¯) > 0. Finally, the
result follows from the intermediate value theorem. For the detailed proof, see A.6
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As XI,i is the optimal demand of the informed agents, it always equates the respective
signal congruent part of the FOC to zero by definition. After substituting XI,H = XU ,
the second part of the FOC is zero and one is left with the first part, which constitutes
the situation for the opposite signal. Being left with the first part of the FOC, we know
from the optimization of the informed that the demand XI,H is too low, as the reaction on
the signal information implied by XI,H is too cautious and the optimal response should
be stronger. Along these lines, XI,H can intuitively be interpreted as the lower bound
on XU . By contrast, plugging in XI,L = XU , we are left with the second part of the
FOC. In this part, the reaction to Si implied by XI,L is too strong and should have
been more modest. Hence, XI,L intuitively constitutes an upper bound on XU . Facing
these two relationships, the truth about the optimal XU has to be situated somewhere
in between XI,H and XI,L. Compared with the first setting, in which it is optimal for
the agent to stick to one strategy, here the optimal solution to the problem is to choose
a middle strategy. However, the strategy cannot be pinned down analytically in terms of
the parameters of the model.
5.3 Equilibrium price
After having guaranteed a solution to the FOC, thus the existence of optimal demand
and describing its main features, the next step is to characterize the equilibrium price.
We start by proving the existence of an equilibrium price that clears the market. Sub-
sequently, we analyze and evaluate the characteristics of the equilibrium price trying to
detect systematic price patterns. The market-clearing condition 1 requires that the de-
mand of the uninformed investor equals noise trader’s demand less the demand of the
informed investors. This enables us to define uninformed demand as a function of in-
formed and noise trader demand, XU(XI , u). Notice that informed demand is a function
of the signal and price, XI(Si, Pλ,i).
XU(Pλ,i, Si, u) =
[
u
1− λ −
λ
1− λ
E[θ|Si]−RPλ,i
αV ar[θ|Si]
]
(61)
Furthermore, we define the uninformed agents’ utility in the respective regimes as a
function of Si and XU(Pλ,i,u) with
ΛL(Si, XU (Pλ,i)) = −α
(
RW0U + (E[θ|SL]−RP )XU (Pλ,i)− αXU (Pλ,i)
2
2
V ar[θ|SL]
)
,
ΛH(Si, XU (Pλ,i)) = −α
(
RW0U + (E[θ|SH ]−RP )XU (Pλ,i)− αXU (Pλ,i)
2
2
V ar[θ|SH ]
)
.
(62)
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Substituting expressions 61 and 62 into the FOC produces an expression that implicitly
characterizes the equilibrium price for each signal regime. Given Si = SH , this yields
0 = ωL ·
(
α
(
(E[θ|SL]−RP )− αV ar[θ|SL]
[
u
1− λ −
λ
1− λ
E[θ|SH ]−RP
αV ar[θ|SH ]
]))
exp (ΛL(SH , Pλ,H)) ,
+ωH ·
(
α
(
(E[θ|SH ]−RP )− αV ar[θ|SH ]
[
u
1− λ −
λ
1− λ
E[θ|SH ]−RP
αV ar[θ|SH ]
]))
exp (ΛH(SH , Pλ,H)) .
(63)
Proposition 2.
1. There exists an equilibrium price function for each signal regime that fulfills condi-
tion 1 and is implicitly defined as
• if Si = SH
Pλ,H = ωL
(
(1− λ)E[θ|SL] + λV ar[θ|SL]
V ar[θ|SH ] (E[θ|SH ]− αuV ar[θ|SL]
)
· exp (ΛL(SH , Pλ,H))(
ωL
V ar[θ|SH ]− λ(V ar[θ|SH ]− V ar[θ|SL])
V ar[θ|SH ] · exp (ΛL(SH , Pλ,H)) + ωH · exp (ΛH(SH , Pλ,H))
)
+ ωH
(E[θ|SH ]− αuV ar[θ|SH ]) · exp (ΛH(SH , Pλ,H))(
ωL
V ar[θ|SH ]− λ(V ar[θ|SH ]− V ar[θ|SL])
V ar[θ|SH ] · exp (ΛL(SH , Pλ,H)) + ωH · exp (ΛH(SH , Pλ,H))
)
(64)
• if Si = SL
Pλ,L = ωL
(E[θ|SL]− αuV ar[θ|SL]) · exp (ΛL(SL, Pλ,L))(
ωH
V ar[θ|SL] + λ(V ar[θ|SH ]− V ar[θ|SL])
V ar[θ|SL] · exp (ΛH(SL, Pλ,L)) + ωL · exp (ΛL(SL, Pλ,L))
)
+ ωH
(
(1− λ)E[θ|SH ] + λV ar[θ|SH ]
V ar[θ|SL] (E[θ|SL]− αuV ar[θ|SH ]
)
· exp (Λh(Sl, Pλ,l))(
ωH
V ar[θ|SL] + λ(V ar[θ|SH ]− V ar[θ|SL])
V ar[θ|SL] · exp (ΛH(SL, Pλ,L)) + ωL · exp (ΛL(SL, Pλ,L))
)
(65)
2. The boundaries for the equilibrium prices of the economy, Pλ,Si ∈ (¯P, P¯ ), are given
by the full information prices of the economy.
• If Si > θˆ,
¯
P = ˆPλ,H and P¯ = ˆPλ,L for all S > θˆ
• If Si < θˆ,
¯
P = ˆPλ,L and P¯ = ˆPλ,H for all S < θˆ
Proof. The proof of existence proceeds very similar to the proof of proposition 1 applying
an intermediate value theorem argument. We show that the function specified in 63 is
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continuous and crosses zero at least once. The price functions stated in the first part of
proposition 2 are derived by simplifying 63 and collecting all Pλ,i that are not part of
the exponential function on one side. The second part of proposition 2 is obtained by
plugging in the full information prices into the implicit price function and evaluating the
function for each signal regime. The function implicitly characterizing the equilibrium
demand is again the derivative of a weighted sum of two moment-generating functions
and hence continuous.
Together, propositions 1 and 2 guarantee the existence of a noisy REE and describe
its most important characteristics. Looking at the expression that indirectly defines
uninformed demand and knowing from proposition 1 that the optimal demand of the
uninformed is unique given S and independent of the signal regime H or L equation
61 elicits that this does not hold for price. If demand is unique and not signal-regime
dependent, then the market-clearing equilibrium price has to be dependent on not only
the signal but also the signal regime. Two potential prices support equation 61 holding
constant the values of u and Si, which only depend on the kind of signal i ∈ {H,L}. This
dichotomy of the market-clearing equilibrium price is at the center of the model. The
demand of the uninformed induces two different prices depending on the signal regime.
Furthermore, we show in proposition 2 that the market price is bounded by the full
information prices but never equals them. Combining these two facts, by definition there
have to be two different price paths whenever the price in the economy converges to the
full information price.
5.4 Price dynamics
In order to make a statement about the price dynamics, it is again necessary to look
at more than one period. We assume an extension of the model towards an additional
trading period, in which the uncertainty of the signal regime is resolved. The setting is
completely analogous to that described in paragraph 4 with the hitherto-known alteration
that the uninformed observe the realization of the signal. In the second period, after the
signal type is revealed there is no uncertainty left in the economy and the full information
price materializes. This gives rise to the price dynamics described in the next proposition.
Proposition 3.
• If Si = SL, the price difference ∆PL will always satisfy ∆P > 0 for all SL > θˆ and
∆P < 0 for all SL < θˆ. In such a case, the economy will experience under-reaction
• If Si = SH , the price difference ∆PH will always satisfy ∆P < 0 for all SH > θˆ and
∆P > 0 for all SH < θˆ. In such a case, the economy will experience over-reaction
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Proof. Proposition 3 follows immediately from the second part of proposition 2.
According to proposition 3, the observable price pattern is purely driven by the signal
regime. Notice that the uninformed agent is unable to distinguish the signal regimes.
As soon as he observes the signal, he does not have to decide in advance which strategy
to play, but according to proposition 1 there exists an optimal demand for each signal
independent of its type. This demand never resembles the demand of the informed agent
but is either above or below it. In comparison to the first part of the paper, when the
uninformed has to choose his strategy a priori, his demand is either too high or too low in
only one state of the economy. The deviation—either over- or under-reaction to a specific
signal regime—depends on the strategy of the uninformed and hence the parametriza-
tion of the economy. It is not possible to generate both over- and under-reaction given
a specific calibration of parameters without introducing variation in mixture weights p.
By contrast, both patterns are feasible in this economy and are solely dependent on the
signal type. They occur as soon as the variances of the two signals differ. Neither the
amount of informed agents λ or the amount of noise trading u nor the variance of the pay
off of the risky asset σθ or the mixture weights have an influence on the existence of these
price pattern. In the first setting, the combination of these parameter values decided
whether the economy experiences under- or over-reaction, while in the extended model
this is no longer true. Here, the cited parameters are simply able to influence the severity
of the movement. Prices always exhibit over-reaction following the high-variance signal
and under-reaction following the low-variance signal. Hence, both varieties are possible
in general, albeit are not equally likely.
Overall, proposition 3 states that given the low-variance regime the equilibrium price
will always be below the full information price, inducing a positive correlated price drift
between the two trading periods. The opposite is true for the high signal regime. The
intuition follows the idea that for the uninformed agents some weighted average of the
demand of the informed agents should be optimal.
6 Conclusion
We propose a rather simple but intuitively tractable model alteration of the classical noisy
rational expectations model that supports price patterns of over- and under-reaction with-
out deviating from the assumption of rationality. By expanding the basic Grossman and
Stiglitz (1980) setting and introducing a heterogeneous signal structure, we are able to
explain empirical price anomalies with the help of a noisy rational expectations model.
Accordingly, we do not rely on sophisticated mechanisms of information transmission or
the like, but rather solely work with different levels of information characteristics. The
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idea is to enrich the information structure beyond the point that one part of the agents in
the economy observes a certain signal and the reminder does not. Instead, we challenge
the idea that information is homogeneous and allow for a second dimension comprising
heterogeneity in in the information structure.
Our results show that financial markets systematically over- or under-react to different
types of signals, giving rise to certain price patterns that could not be avoided ex ante.
Furthermore, we show that the added layer of information on its own suffices to incur a
systematic deviation from the classical price building mechanism in noisy REE models.
The price system is unable to dissolve the information asymmetry in the economy in such
a setting.
The implemented information structure splits up the value of possessing information
into two distinct parts: first, the classical notion of information by introducing two noisy
signals, whose value is observed by a group of agents; and second, the ability to evaluate
the received information appropriately. We show that being able to judge the actual qual-
ity of one’s information appropriately is a valuable asset. Simply receiving information
is insufficient to make optimal inference.
Additionally, the results in the first part of the paper support the notion that it is
always beneficial to participate in the market and use the information at hand, even
though this behavior implicates getting things not exactly right. This ”second-best”
strategy of drawing inference is always superior to simply ignoring information at hand
and acting independent of one’s information set. Put briefly, according to our result
acting on information not optimally in a ”first-best” kind of way can be rational, while
not utilizing information is definitely at odds with the notion of rationality.
Taking a look at the empirical literature, our implications suit many findings on price
over- and under-reactions on financial markets. Furthermore, they do not contradict
the vast amount of behavioral biases that are said to be at the heart of price dynamics
such as over- and under-reaction. We rather view these biases as complementary to our
model. The main contribution is to highlight that over- and under-reaction also occur
if agents are fully rational without drawing on sophisticated mechanisms of information
dissemination or the existence of future markets and the like. However, an important
question that has not yet been answered is how the altered information structure affects
the equilibrium in the information market. This issue has to be investigated in further
detail as it is vital for establishing the value of information and its implications on the
information-generating process on financial markets.
38
References
Agrawal, A., Jaffe, J. F., & Mandelker, G. N. (1992). The post-merger performance of
acquiring firms: A re-examination of an anomaly. The Journal of Finance, 47 (4),
1605–1621.
Andrei, D., & Cujean, J. (2017). Information percolation, momentum and reversal.
Journal of Financial Economics , 123 (3), 617–645.
Banerjee, S., Kaniel, R., & Kremer, I. (2009). Price drift as an outcome of differences in
higher-order beliefs. The Review of Financial Studies , 22 (9), 3707-3734.
Barberis, N., Shleifer, A., & Vishny, R. (1998). A model of investor sentiment. Journal
of Financial Economics , 49 (3), 307.343.
Berk, J. B., Green, R. C., & Naik, V. (1999). Optimal investment, growth options, and
security returns. The Journal of Finance, 54 (5), 1553-1607.
Bernard, V. L., & Thomas, J. K. (1990, December). Evidence that stock prices do not
fully reflect the implications of current earnings for future earnings. Journal of
Accounting and Economics , 13 (4), 305–340.
Breon-Drish, B. (2015). On existence and uniqueness of equilibrium in a class of noisy
rational expectations models. The Review of Economic Studies , rdv012.
Brunnermeier, M. K. (2001). Asset pricing under asymmetric information: Bubbles,
crashes, technical analysis, and herding. Oxford University Press on Demand.
Brunnermeier, M. K. (2005). Information leakage and market efficiency. Review of
Financial Studies , 18 (2), 417–457.
Cespa, G., & Vives, X. (2012). Dynamic trading and asset prices: Keynes vs. hayek. The
Review of Economic Studies , 79 (2), 539-580.
Chan, L. K. C., Jegadeesh, N., & Lakonishok, J. (1996). Momentum strategies. The
Journal of Finance, 51 (5), 1681–1713.
Chan, W. S. (2003). Stock price reaction to news and no-news: Drift and reversal after
headlines. Journal of Financial Economics , 70 (2), 223–260.
Daniel, K., Hirshleifer, D., & Subrahmanyam, A. (1998). Investor psychology and security
market under- and overreactions. Journal of Finance, 53 (6), 1839–1885.
Dharan, B. G., & Ikenberry, D. L. (1995). The long-run negative drift of post-listing
stock returns. The Journal of Finance, 50 (5), 1547–1574.
Duffie, D., & Manso, G. (2007). Information percolation in large markets. The American
Economic Review , 97 (2), 203-209.
Gleason, C. A., & Lee, C. M. C. (2003). Analyst forecast revisions and market price
discovery. The Accounting Review , 78 (1), 193–225.
Grossman, S. J., & Stiglitz, J. E. (1980). On the impossibility of informationally efficient
markets. The American Economic Review , 70 (3), 393–408.
39
Holden, C. W., & Subrahmanyam, A. (2002). News events, information acquisition, and
serial correlation. The Journal of Business , 75 (1), 1-32.
Hong, H., & Stein, J. C. (1999). A unified theory of underreaction, momentum trading,
and overreaction in asset markets. The Journal of Finance.
Jegadeesh, N., & Titman, S. (1993). Returns to buying winners and selling losers:
Implications for stock market efficiency. The Journal of Finance.
Johnson, T. C. (2002). Rational momentum effects. Journal of Finance, 57 (2), 585–608.
Lakonishok, J., & Vermaelen, T. (1990). Anomalous price behavior around repurchase
tender offers. The Journal of Finance, 45 (2), 455–477.
Lee, C., & Swaminathan, B. (2000). Price momentum and trading volume. The Journal
of Finance.
Manzano, C., & Vives, X. (2011). Public and private learning from prices, strate-
gic substitutability and complementarity, and equilibrium multiplicity. Journal of
Mathematical Economics , 47 (3), 346–369.
Medran, L. A., & Vives, X. (2004). Regulating insider trading when investment matters.
Review of Finance, 8 (2), 199–277.
Odean, T. (1998). Volume, Volatility, Price, and Profit When All Traders Are Above
Average. The Journal of Finance, 53 (6), 1887–1934.
O’hara, M. (1995). Market microstructure theory (Vol. 108). Blackwell Cambridge, MA.
Rao, C. R. (1973). Linear statistical inference and its applications (Vol. 2). Wiley New
York.
Ritter, J. R. (1991). The long-runperformance of initial public offerings. The Journal of
Finance, 46 (1), 3–27.
Sagi, J. S., & Seasholes, M. S. (2007). Firm-specific attributes and the cross-section of
momentum. Journal of Financial Economics , 84 (2), 389–434.
Vives, X. (2008). Information and learning in markets: the impact of market microstruc-
ture. Princeton University Press Princeton.
40
Appendices
A Derivations and proofs
A.1 Distribution of adjusted volume
In detail, adjusted volume writes:
νH = θˆ +
σ2θ
σ2θ + σ
2
H
(SH − θˆ)− α
2λ
σ2θσ
2
H
σ2θ + σ
2
H
(u− uˆ)
νL = θˆ +
σ2θ
σ2θ + σ
2
L
(SL − θˆ)− α
2λ
σ2θσ
2
L
σ2θ + σ
2
L
(u− uˆ)
which can be rewritten as
νH = θˆ + FH(SH − θˆ −
ασ2H
2λ︸ ︷︷ ︸
KH
(u− uˆ))
νL = θˆ + FL(SL − θˆ −
ασ2L
2λ︸ ︷︷ ︸
KL
(u− uˆ))
Adjusted volume ν is distributed as a Gaussian mixture with mixture weights p and 1 − p
inherited from 3 and components given by
νH ∼ N
(
θˆ, FH
2(σ2θ + σ
2
H
+ (
ασ2H
2λ
)2σ2u)
)
and νL ∼ N
(
θˆ, FL
2(σ2θ + σ
2
L
+ (
ασ2L
2λ
)2σ2u)
)
Given the distributions of νH and νL, adjusted volume νi and θ for each mixture component
are distributed jointly normal.
θ
νH
∼ N
[(
θˆ
θˆ
)
,
(
σ2θ FHσ
2
θ
FHσ
2
θ F
2
H(σ
2
θ + σ
2
H
+K2Hσ
2
u)
)]
θ
νL
∼ N
[(
θˆ
θˆ
)
,
(
σ2θ FLσ
2
θ
FLσ
2
θ F
2
L(σ
2
θ + σ
2
L
+K2Lσ
2
u)
)]
By the projection theorem, the expected value of θ given νi is
E[θ|νH ] = θˆ + 1
FH
σ2θ
(σ2θ + σ
2
H
+K2Hσ
2
u)
(νH − θˆ) = θˆ +
σ2θ + σ
2
H
(σ2θ + σ
2
H
+K2Hσ
2
u)︸ ︷︷ ︸
GH
(νH − θˆ)
E[θ|νL] = θˆ + 1
FL
σ2θ
(σ2θ + σ
2
L
+K2Lσ
2
u)
(νL − θˆ) = θˆ +
σ2θ + σ
2
L
(σ2θ + σ
2
L
+K2Lσ
2
u)︸ ︷︷ ︸
GL
(νL − θˆ)
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the variance of θ given νi is
V ar[θ|νH ] = σ2θ −
(FHσ
2
θ)
2
FH
2(σ2θ + σ
2
H
+KH
2σ2u)
=
σ2θ(σ
2
H
+KH
2σ2u)
(σ2θ + σ
2
H
+KH
2σ2u)
V ar[θ|νL] = σ2θ −
(FLσ
2
θ)
2
FL
2(σ2θ + σ
2
L
+KL
2σ2u)
=
σ2θ(σ
2
L
+KL
2σ2u)
(σ2θ + σ
2
L
+KL
2σ2u)
(66)
A.2 Utility of the informed
Utility of the informed is given by
E[V (W1I)|Si] = −exp
[
− α(E[W1I |Si]− α
2
V ar[W1I |Si]
)]
(67)
with W1I being
W1I = RW0I + (θ −RP )XI ,
Using 39 and plugging in W1I and XI
E[W1I |Si] = E
[
RW0I + (θ −RPλ;i,j)XI
∣∣Si]
= E
[
RW0I + (θ −RPλ;i,j)E[θ|Si]−RPλ;i,j
α ∗ V ar[θ|Si]
∣∣Si]
= RW0I +
(E[θ|Si]−RPλ;i,j)2
α ∗ V ar[θ|Si]
V ar[W1I |Si] = V ar
[
RW0I + (θ −RPλ;i,j)XI
∣∣Si]
= V ar
[
(θ −RPλ;i,j)E[θ|Si]−RPλ;i,j
α ∗ V ar[θ|Si]
∣∣Si]
=
(E[θ|Si]−RPλ;i,j)2
α2 ∗ V ar[θ|Si]2 V ar
[
(θ −RP )∣∣Si]
=
(E[θ|Si]−RPλ;i,j)2
α2 ∗ V ar[θ|Si]2 V ar[θ|Si]
=
(E[θ|Si]−RPλ;i,j)2
α2 ∗ V ar[θ|Si]
one gets
E[V (W1I)|Si] = −exp
[
− α
(
RW0I +
(E[θ|Si]−RPλ;i,j)2
α ∗ V ar[θ|Si] −
α
2
(E[θ|Si]−RPλ;i,j)2
α2 ∗ V ar[θ|Si]
)]
= −exp
[
− α
(
RW0I +
1
2
(E[θ|Si]−RPλ;i,j)2
α ∗ V ar[θ|Si]
)]
= −exp
[
− αRW0I − 1
2
(E[θ|Si]−RPλ;i,j)2
V ar[θ|Si]
]
= −exp
[
− αRW0I
]
∗ exp
[
− 1
2
(E[θ|Si]−RPλ;i,j)2
V ar[θ|Si]
]
.
(68)
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We proceed by evaluating the second component of 68 conditional on νi
E
[
exp
(
− 1
2
(E[θ|Si]−RPλ;i,j)2
V ar[θ|Si]
)∣∣∣∣νi]. (69)
In order to determine the above expression, it is important to establish some intermediate
results. By the law of iterated expectations
E[θ|Si] = θ¯ + cov[θSi]
V ar[Si]
(Si − θˆ)
E
[
E[θ|Si]
∣∣νi] = E[θ|νi] (70)
Notice the fact that the only stochastic variables are Si and u. Thus, the variance of E[θ|Si]
given νi, according to the projection theorem writes
V ar
[
E[θ|Si]
∣∣νi] = F 2i V ar[Si]− (F 2i V ar[Si])2V ar[νi] = Fiσ
2
θ ∗Ki2σ2u
(σ2θ + σ
2
i +Ki
2σ2u)
(71)
With this in mind, we define a new variable Z as
Z =
(E[θ|Si]−RPλ;i,j)√
V ar
[
E[θ|Si]
∣∣νi] (72)
and plug it into expression 69.
E
[
exp
(
− 1
2
(E[θ|Si]−RPλ;i,j)2
V ar[θ|Si]
)∣∣∣∣νi] = E
[
exp
(
−V ar
[
E[θ|Si]
∣∣νi]
2V ar [θ|Si] Z
2
)∣∣∣∣νi
]
. (73)
In the following we closely follow the lines of Grossman and Stiglitz (1980) Appendix B. Knowing
that Si is normal for SH and SL, E[θ|Si] is also normal. The same holds for the distribution of
E[θ|Si] conditional on νi, making Z2 the square of a standardized normal variable with some
mean µ and variance of 1 and hence distributed non-central chi-square with one df. (see Rao,
1973, p. 173). To solve 73 we use the moment-generating function of the non-central chi-square
distribution , which in our case is given by
E[etZ
2 |νi] = 1√
1− 2texp
[
E([Z|νi])2t
1− 2t
]
(74)
with t = −V ar[E[θ|Si]|νi]2V ar[θ|Si] and the non-centrality parameter
(E [E[θ|Si]|νi]−RPλ;i,j)2
V ar [E[θ|Si]|νi] . Substitut-
ing
1− 2t = 1 + V ar
[
E[θ|Si]
∣∣νi]
V ar[θ|Si] =
V ar
[
E[θ|Si]
∣∣νi]+ V ar[θ|Si]
V ar[θ|Si] =
V ar[θ|νi]
V ar[θ|Si] (75)
43
and
t
1− 2t =
V ar[θ|Si]
V ar[θ|νi]
(
− V ar
[
E[θ|Si]
∣∣νi]
2V ar[θ|Si]
)
= −V ar
[
E[θ|Si]
∣∣νi]
2V ar[θ|νi] (76)
into 74 yields
E
[
exp
(
− V ar
[
E[θ|Si]
∣∣νi]
2V ar[θ|Si] Z
2
∣∣νi)]
=
√
V ar[θ|Si]
V ar[θ|νi] exp
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− V ar
[
E[θ|Si]
∣∣νi]
2V ar[θ|νi]
(
E
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E[θ|Si]
∣∣νi]−RPλ;i,j)2
V ar
[
E[θ|Si]
∣∣νi]
]
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√
V ar[θ|Si]
V ar[θ|νi] exp
[
−
(
E[θ|νi]−RPλ;i,j
)2
2V ar[θ|νi]
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(77)
Using the result of 77 and plugging in 68 yields the expected utility of the informed agent given
the νi
E [E[V (W1I)|Si]|νi] = V (RW0I)
√
V ar[θ|Si]
V ar[θ|νi] ∗ exp
[
−
(
E[θ|νi]−RPλ;i,j
)2
2V ar[θ|νi]
]
. (78)
A.3 Utility of the uninformed
Starting at
E[V (W1U )|νi] = −exp
[
− α(E[W1U |νi]− α
2
V ar[W1U |νi]
)]
(79)
with W1U being
W1U = RW0U + (θ −RP )XU . (80)
Using 79 and plugging in W1U and XU
E[W1U |νi] = E
[
RW0U + (θ −RPλ;i,j)XU
∣∣νi]
= E
[
RW0U + (θ −RPλ;i,j)E[θ|ν
j
i , Pλ;i,j ]−RPλ;i,j
α ∗ V ar[θ|νji , Pλ;i,j ]
∣∣νi]
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[
(θ −RPλ;i,j)E[θ|ν
j
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∣∣νi]
(81)
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V ar[W1U |νi] = V ar
[
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∣∣νi]
= V ar
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θ
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(82)
one gets
E[V (W1U )|νi] =− exp
[
− α
(
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)]
= −exp
[
− αRW0U − E[θ|ν
j
i , Pλ;i,j ]−RPλ;i,j
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(E[θ|νi]−RPλ;i,j)− 1
2
(
E[θ|νji , Pλ;i,j ]−RPλ;i,j
) V ar [θ∣∣νi]
V ar[θ|νji , Pλ;i,j ]
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.
(83)
After factoring expected utility of the uninformed writes
E [E[V (W1U )|νi]] = −exp [−αRW0U ] ∗
E
[
exp
[
−E[θ|ν
j
i , Pλ;i,j ]−RPλ;i,j
α ∗ V ar[θ|νji , Pλ;i,j ]
(
(E[θ|νi]−RPλ;i,j)−
1
2
(
E[θ|νji , Pλ;i,j ]−RPλ;i,j
) V ar [θ∣∣νi]
V ar[θ|νji , Pλ;i,j ]
)]]
(84)
If i = j, 84 reduces to
E[V (W1U )|νi] = −exp
[
− αRW0U
]
∗ exp
[
− 1
2
(E[θ|νi]−RPλ;i)2
V ar[θ|νi]
]
= V (RW0U ) ∗ exp
[
− 1
2
(E[θ|νi]−RPλ;i)2
V ar[θ|νi]
]
.
(85)
A.4 Proof of Theorem 3.1
Lemma A.1. The utility of the uniformed agents after entering the market always exceeds the
end of period utility of the initial wealth of the uninformed agents. Therefore, staying out of the
market is not a feasible strategy. Furthermore, it is always superior for the uninformed agents
to play strategy (H) compared to completely staying out of the market or entering the market
45
without trying to infer information from the price system.
Not trying to infer information from the price system can be thought of as maximizing based
on an unconditional information set.
Proof. For the proof, we simply consider the low uncertainty regime, as it is the scenario when
playing strategy (H) is not by definition superior to the other strategies. If the uninformed
agent gets his inference right, which is in the scenario of the high volatility regime, the expected
utility of the uninformed using his information set in the right way by definition exceeds the
utility of the uninformed if ignored the information that he receives from price. We proceed
by defining the expected utility of the uninformed for the three scenarios: (i) not entering the
market at all; (ii) entering given unconditional expectations; and (iii) playing strategy (H).
Subsequently, we show that playing strategy (H) always strictly dominates the other two op-
tions.
The utility if the uninformed stays away from the market is given by
E[V (W0U )] = −exp [−αW0U ] (86)
The utility of the uninformed when maximizing given unconditional expectations is calculated
as follows. According to equation 25 the demand of the uninformed writes
XU =
E[θ]− Pλ,H
α ∗ V ar[θ] , (87)
and the respective price according to 30 would be given by
Pλ,L,Uc =
λ
αV ar[θ|SL]νL +
(1− λ)
αV ar[θ]
E[θ]
λ
αV ar[θ|SL] +
(1− λ)
αV ar[θ]
. (88)
The expected value of wealth of the uninformed conditional on the true adjusted volume is
given by plugging 87 into 80 and taking expectations
E[W1U |νL] = W0U + (E[θ|νL]− Pλ;L,Uc)E[θ]− Pλ;L,Uc
α ∗ V ar[θ] , (89)
while the expected variance of wealth of the uninformed conditional on the true adjusted volume
is given by plugging 87 into 80 and determining the variance which writes
V ar[W1U |νL] = (E[θ]− Pλ;L,Uc)
2
α ∗ V ar[θ]
V ar[θ|νL]
α ∗ V ar[θ] . (90)
Plugging 89 and 82 into 46 and writing everything in terms of the parameters of the model and
46
as a function of (νL − θˆ) yields
E [E[V (W1U )|νi]] = −exp [−αRW0U ] ∗
E
[
exp
[
− λ
2σ2L
(
(λ− 2)λ+ α2σ2Lσ2u
)
(σ2L + σ
2
θ)
2σ2θ(σ
2
L
+ λσ2θ)
2(λ2σ2L + α
2σ4Lσ
2
u + λ
2σ2θ)
(νL − θˆ)2
]]
.
(91)
Now we define a new variable ZU
ZU =
(νL − θˆ)√
V ar[νL]
. (92)
Since νL is normal with Mean θˆ, ZU is distributed standard normal and hence Z
2
U is distributed
central chi-square with one degree of freedom (see Rao, 1973, p. 173). Plugging Z2U into 91
yields
E [E[V (W1U )|νi]] = −exp [−αRW0U ] ∗
E
[
exp
[
− λ
2σ2L
(
(λ− 2)λ+ α2σ2Lσ2u
)
(σ2L + σ
2
θ)
2σ2θ(σ
2
L
+ λσ2θ)
2(λ2σ2L + α
2σ4Lσ
2
u + λ
2σ2θ)
∗ V ar[νL] ∗ Z2U
]]
.
(93)
Given the distributional characteristics of Z2U , the expectation can be solved by using the
moment-generating function of a central chi-square distribution, which is given by
E[etZ
2
] =
1√
1− 2t , (94)
with
tUc = −
λ2σ2L
(
(λ− 2)λ+ α2σ2Lσ2u
)
(σ2L + σ
2
θ)
2σ2θ(σ
2
L
+ λσ2θ)
2(λ2σ2L + α
2σ4Lσ
2
u + λ
2σ2θ)
∗ V ar[νL]. (95)
If the uninformed agent plays the conservative strategy (H), the parameters of the model
are given as stated in the second part of section 3.3. The expected value and variance of
end-of-period wealth are given by
E[W1U |νHL ] = RW0U + (E [θ|νL]−RPλ;L,H)
E[θ|νHL , Pλ;L,H ]−RPλ;L,H
α ∗ V ar[θ|νHL , Pλ;L,H ]
, (96)
V ar[W1U |νHL ] =
(
E[θ|νHL , Pλ;L,H ]−RPλ;L,H
)2
α ∗ V ar[θ|νHL , Pλ;L,H ]
V ar
[
θ
∣∣νL]
α ∗ V ar[θ|νHL , Pλ;L,H ]
. (97)
Plugging 96 and 97 into 46 and writing everything in terms of the parameters of the model and
47
as a function of (νL − θˆ) yields
E [E[V (W1U )|νi]] = −exp [−αRW0U ] ∗
E
[
exp
[
− α
4λ2σ2Lσ
2
H
σ4u
(
2λσ2L + σ
2
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(
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2
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2
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(
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(
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2
u
)
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(
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2
u
)
σ3θ
)2 ∗ (νL − θˆ)2
]]
.
(98)
Now, one can again substitute ZU and solve the expectation using the moment-generating
function given by 94 with t defined as
tL,H = −
α4λ2σ2Lσ
2
H
σ4u
(
2λσ2L + σ
2
H
(
(λ− 2)λ+ α2σ2Lσ2u
))
(σ2L + σ
2
θ)
2
2(λ2σ2L + α
2σ4Lσ
2
u + λ
2σ2θ)
(
σ2L
(
λ2 + α2σ2Hσ
2
u
)
σθ + λ
(
λ+ α2σ2Hσ
2
u
)
σ3θ
)2 ∗V ar[νL].
(99)
As utility is negative due to the CARA setting, the lower the term, the higher the utility
of the uninformed agents. As the moment-generating function 94 is monotone decreasing with
the absolute value of t, we show that it generally holds that |tL,H | > |tUC . After some tedious
algebra, the problem boils down to
α4σ2Hσ
4
u
(
σ2H
(
(λ− 2)λ+ α2σ2Lσ2u
)
+ 2λσ2L
)(
σθσ2L
(
α2σ2Hσ
2
u + λ
2
)
+ λσ3θ
(
α2σ2Hσ
2
u + λ
))2 > (λ− 2)λ+ α2σ2Lσ2u
σ2θ
(
λσ2θ + σ
2
L
)2 (100)
which is true for all ∀ σ2θ ≥ 1, σ2u ≥ 1, 1 ≤ σ2L < σ2H , 1 ≤ α and 0 < λ < 1.
Lemma A.2. There exists a value p∗ determined by the parameters of the model that marks the
threshold p∗, determining the overall optimality between strategies (H) and (L). Given p < p∗,
it is always superior for the uninformed agents to play strategy (L) compared to strategy (H).
Given p > p∗ it is always superior for the uninformed agents to play strategy (H) compared to
strategy (L)
Proof. If the uninformed agent plays strategy L and the true signal regime is given by H, the
parameters and variables of the model are
XU ;H,L =
E[θ|νLH , Pλ,HL]− Pλ,HL
α ∗ V ar[θ|νLH , Pλ,HL]
, (101)
νLH = νH +
V ar[θ|SL]− V ar[θ|SH ]
V ar[θ|SH ] (νH − Pλ,HL), (102)
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Pλ;H,L =
λ
αV ar[θ|SH ]νH +
(1− λ)
αV ar[θ|νL] [θˆ +GL(1 +
V ar[θ|SL]− V ar[θ|SH ]
V ar[θ|SH ] )νH − θˆ)]
λ
αV ar[θ|SH ] +
(1− λ)
αV ar[θ|νL] (1 +GL(
V ar[θ|SL]− V ar[θ|SH ]
V ar[θ|SH ] )
. (103)
The expected value and variance of end-of-period wealth are given by
E[W1U |νLH ] = RW0U + (E[θ|νH ]−RPλ;H,L)
E[θ|νLH , Pλ;H,L]−RPλ;H,L
α ∗ V ar[θ|νLH , Pλ;H,L]
, (104)
and
V ar[W1U |νLH ] =
(
E[θ|νLH , Pλ;H,L]−RPλ;H,L
)2
α ∗ V ar[θ|νLH , Pλ;H,L]
V ar
[
θ
∣∣νH]
α ∗ V ar[θ|νLH , Pλ;H,L]
. (105)
Plugging 104 and 105 into 46 and writing everything in terms of the parameters of the model
and as a function of (νL − θˆ) yields
E [E[V (W1U )|νH ]] = −exp [−αRW0U ] ∗
E
[
exp
[
− α
4λ2σ2Lσ
2
H
σ4u
(
(λ− 2)λσ2L + σ2H
(
2λ+ α2σ2Lσ
2
u
))
(σ2H + σ
2
θ)
2
2(λ2σ2H + α
2σ4Hσ
2
u + λ
2σ2θ)
(
σ2H
(
λ2 + α2σ2Lσ
2
u
)
σθ + λ
(
λ+ α2σ2lσ
2
u
)
σ3θ
)2 ∗ (νH − θˆ)2
]]
.
(106)
Defining ZU,H as
ZU,H =
(νH − θˆ)√
V ar[νH ]
, (107)
and plugging in yields
E [E[V (W1U )|νH ]] = −exp [−αRW0U ] ∗
E
[
exp
[
− α
4λ2σ2Lσ
2
H
σ4u
(
(λ− 2)λσ2L + σ2H
(
2λ+ α2σ2Lσ
2
u
))
(σ2H + σ
2
θ)
2
2(λ2σ2H + α
2σ4Hσ
2
u + λ
2σ2θ)
(
σ2H
(
λ2 + α2σ2Lσ
2
u
)
σθ + λ
(
λ+ α2σ2lσ
2
u
)
σ3θ
)2 ∗ V ar[νH ] ∗ Z2U,H
]]
.
(108)
Using 94, t is given by
tH,L = −
α4λ2σ2Lσ
2
H
σ4u
(
(λ− 2)λσ2L + σ2H
(
2λ+ α2σ2Lσ
2
u
))
(σ2H + σ
2
θ)
2
2(λ2σ2H + α
2σ4Hσ
2
u + λ
2σ2θ)
(
σ2H
(
λ2 + α2σ2Lσ
2
u
)
σθ + λ
(
λ+ α2σ2lσ
2
u
)
σ3θ
)2 ∗ V ar[νH ]
= −α
4σ2Lσ
2
H
σ4u
(
(λ− 2)λσ2L + σ2H
(
2λ+ α2σ2Lσ
2
u
))
(σ2H + σ
2
θ)
2
2
(
σ2H
(
λ2 + α2σ2Lσ
2
u
)
σθ + λ
(
λ+ α2σ2lσ
2
u
)
σ3θ
)2
(109)
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Remember that the utility in case the uninformed gets the signal regime right is given by 47
and writes
E[V (W1U )|νL] = V (RW0U ) ∗ exp
[
− 1
2
(E[θ|νL]−RPλ;L)2
V ar[θ|νL]
]
. (110)
The corresponding price is given by
Pλ,L =
λ
αV ar[θ|SL]νL +
(1− λ)
αV ar[θ|νL]E[θ|νL]
λ
αV ar[θ|SL] +
(1− λ)
αV ar[θ|νL]
. (111)
Plugging equation 111, the model parameters and ZU,H in 110 yields
E [E[V (W1U )|νH ]] = −exp [−αRW0U ] ∗
E
[
exp
[
− α
4λ2σ6Lσ
4
u
(
λ2 + α2σ2Lσ
2
u
)
(σ2L + σ
2
θ)
2
2(λ2σ2L + α
2σ4Lσ
2
u + λ
2σ2θ)
(
σ2L
(
λ2 + α2σ2Lσ
2
u
)
σθ + λ
(
λ+ α2σ2lσ
2
u
)
σ3θ
)2 ∗ V ar[νH ] ∗ Z2U,H
]]
,
(112)
and
tL = −
α4σ6Lσ
4
u
(
λ2 + α2σ2Lσ
2
u
)
(σ2L + σ
2
θ)
2
2
(
σ2L
(
λ2 + α2σ2Lσ
2
u
)
σθ + λ
(
λ+ α2σ2lσ
2
u
)
σ3θ
)2 . (113)
The corresponding t = tH for the high-variance regime is given analogous to 113 and writes
tH = −
α4σ6Hσ
4
u
(
λ2 + α2σ2Hσ
2
u
)
(σ2H + σ
2
θ)
2
2
(
σ2H
(
λ2 + α2σ2Hσ
2
u
)
σθ + λ
(
λ+ α2σ2lσ
2
u
)
σ3θ
)2 . (114)
Using 94, 109 and 113 the overall utility of the uninformed playing the more aggressive
strategy (L) is given by
E[V (W1U,L)] = V (RW0U )
(
p√
1 + 2tH,L
+
1− p√
1 + 2tL
)
, (115)
while, according to 99 and 114 the overall utility for playing the more modest strategy (H) is
given by
E[V (W1U,H)] = V (RW0U )
(
p√
1 + 2tH
+
1− p√
1 + 2tL,H
)
. (116)
As 94 is a convex function ∀ t < 0 and the sum of a convex function is also a convex function,
115 and 116 intersect at most once and they do. Thus, there exists a unique value of p, which
we denote as p∗, dependent on the parameters of the model, which decides the optimal strategy
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of the uninformed. The value of p∗ is determined by the equation
E[V (W1U,L)] = E[V (W1U,H)](
p√
1 + 2tH,L
+
1− p√
1 + 2tL
)
=
(
p√
1 + 2tH
+
1− p√
1 + 2tL,H
)
.
(117)
Solving for p yields
p∗ =
1√
1 + 2tH,L
− 1√
1 + 2tL
− 1√
1 + 2tH
+
1√
1 + 2tH,L
− 1√
1 + 2tL
+
1√
1 + 2tL,H
. (118)
As long as p < p∗, it is optimal for the uninformed agent to play the more aggressive strategy
(L). As soon as p > p∗, it is optimal for the agent to play the more conservative strategy (H).
For p = p∗, the uninformed agent is indifferent between the two strategies.
A.5 Proof of Theorem 4.1
Proof. Given that the uninformed plays strategy (L), the price movement occurs in the high-
variance regime. The first-period price P1 is given by 103, while the price in the second period
P2 is given by 35. Plugging in the parameters and rearranging the price difference between
period one and two, P2 − P1 = ∆P2 can be written as
∆P2 =
− (1− λ)λ
2α2σ2Hσ
2
u(σ
2
H
− σ2L)
(
σ2H + σ
2
θ
)(
σ2H
(
λ2 + α2σ2Lσ
2
u
)
+ λ
(
λ+ α2σ2lσ
2
u
)
σ2θ
) (
α2σ4Hσ
2
u + λ
2σ2θ + λσ
2
H
(
λ+ α2σ2uσ
2
θ
)) · (νH − θˆ).
(119)
Hence, it holds ∆P2 < 0 ∀ νH > θˆ and ∆P2 > 0 ∀ νH < θˆ. This translates into a
negative covariance of the price change between t1 and t2. Given E[∆P2] = 0 the covariance is
determined by E[∆P1∆P2] which writes
cov[∆P1∆P2] =
− (1− λ)λ
3α2σ2Hσ
2
u(σ
2
H
− σ2L)
(
σ2H + σ
2
θ
)2(
σ2H
(
λ2 + α2σ2Lσ
2
u
)
+ λ
(
λ+ α2σ2lσ
2
u
)
σ2θ
)2 (
α2σ4Hσ
2
u + λ
2σ2θ + λσ
2
H
(
λ+ α2σ2uσ
2
θ
)) · V ar[νH ]
(120)
One can infer from equation 120 that the covariance in the price movement if the uninformed
plays L is always negative, cov[∆P1∆P2] < 0.
Given that the uninformed plays strategy (H) modest, the price movement occurs in the
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low-variance regime and the mechanics are vice versa. The first-period price P1 is given by
38, while the price in the second period P2 is given by 111. Plugging in the parameters and
rearranging the price difference between period one and two, P2−P1 = ∆P2 can be written as
∆P2 =
(1− λ)λ2α2σ2Lσ2u(σ2H − σ2L)
(
σ2L + σ
2
θ
)(
σ2L
(
λ2 + α2σ2Hσ
2
u
)
+ λ
(
λ+ α2σ2Hσ
2
u
)
σ2θ
) (
α2σ4Lσ
2
u + λ
2σ2θ + λσ
2
L
(
λ+ α2σ2uσ
2
θ
)) · (νL − θˆ).
(121)
Hence it holds ∆P2 > 0 ∀ νL > θˆ and ∆P2 < 0 ∀ νL < θˆ. This translates into a
positive covariance of the price change between t1 and t2. Given E[∆P2] = 0, the covariance is
determined by E[∆P1∆P2] which writes
cov[∆P1∆P2] =
(1− λ)λ3α2σ2Lσ2u(σ2H − σ2L)
(
σ2L + σ
2
θ
)2(
σ2L
(
λ2 + α2σ2Hσ
2
u
)
+ λ
(
λ+ α2σ2Hσ
2
u
)
σ2θ
)2 (
α2σ4Lσ
2
u + λ
2σ2θ + λσ
2
L
(
λ+ α2σ2uσ
2
θ
)) · V ar[νH ]
(122)
One can infer from equation 122 that the covariance in the price movement if the uninformed
plays H is always positive, cov[∆P1∆P2] > 0.
A.6 Proof of Proposition 1
Proof. Notice that 57 is a weighted sum of two moment-generating functions (as shown in 3.4,
the expected utility of a CARA investor is essentially a moment-generating function). Every
moment-generating function (MGF) is continuously differentiable in its domain of existence. It
is known that the sum of continuously-differentiable functions is also continuously differentiable
and the derivative of a continuously-differentiable function is continuous. Hence, 59 is continu-
ous and the intermediate value theorem is applicable. Monotonicity is implied by the fact that
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the first derivative of 59 w.r.t XU is given by
− α2exp
(
1
2
α
(− 4RW0U +XU (−2((E[θ|SL]−RP ) + (E[θ|SH ]−RP ))
+ αXU (V ar[θ|SL] + V ar[θ|SH ]))
))
(
ωH
(
V ar[θ|SH ] + ((E[θ|SH ]−RP )− αXUV ar[θ|SH ])2
)
exp
(
−α
(
RW0U + (E[θ|SL]−RP )XU − αX
2
U
2
V ar[θ|SL]
))
+ ωL
(
V ar[θ|SL] + ((E[θ|SL]−RP )− αXUV ar[θ|SL])2
)
exp
(
−α
(
RW0U + (E[θ|SH ]−RP )XU − αX
2
U
2
V ar[θ|SH ]
)))
.
(123)
The above expression is always smaller than 0 and thus, 59 is monotonically decreasing in XU .
Our next goal is to prove that the optimal demand of the uninformed agents is bounded by the
optimal demand of the informed agents XU ∈ (XI,H , XI,L). This is achieved in two steps: first,
by substituting the demand of the uninformed agents by the optimal demand of the informed
agents; and second, by verifying that the ratio of
FOC(XI,H)
FOC(XI,L)
< 0. We define the agent’s utility
in the respective regimes as a function of Si and XU with
Ω(Si, XU ) = −α
(
RW0U + (E[θ|Si]−RP )XU − αX
2
U
2
V ar[θ|Si]
)
. (124)
Substituting XU = XI,H into the FOC, one gets
ωL · α
(
(E[θ|SL]−RP )− (E[θ|SH ]−RP ) V ar[θ|SL]
V ar[θ|SH ]
)
· exp (Ω (Si, XU = XI,H)) (125)
which, after plugging in all parameters, reduces to
ωL · α
(
σ2θ(σ
2
H
− σ2L)
σ2H(σ
2
θ + σ
2
L
)
(S −RP )
)
· exp (Ω (Si, XU = XI,H)) . (126)
Since the exponential part of the expression is always positive, it is sufficient to analyze the
expression in front of the exponential function. Taking a closer look and knowing that σ2H > σ
2
L
and due to risk aversion |S| > |P |, it becomes apparent that the above expression is > 0 for
S > 0 and < 0 for S < 0.
Substituting XU = XIL the dynamics are exactly vice versa, yielding
ωH · α
(
(E[θ|SH ]−RP )− (E[θ|SL]−RP )V ar[θ|SH ]
V ar[θ|SL]
)
· exp (Ω (Si, XU = XI,L)) , (127)
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which simplifies to
ωH · α
(
σ2θ(σ
2
L
− σ2H )
σ2L(σ
2
θ + σ
2
H
)
(S −RP )
)
· exp (Ω (Si, XU = XI,L)) , (128)
which is > 0 for S < 0 and < 0 for S > 0. Combining equations 128 and 126 in a ratio and
simplifying
ωL · α
(
σ2θ(σ
2
H
− σ2L)
σ2H(σ
2
θ + σ
2
L
)
(S −RP )
)
· exp (Ω (Si, XU = XI,H))
ωH · α
(
σ2θ(σ
2
L
− σ2H )
σ2L(σ
2
θ + σ
2
H
)
(S −RP )
)
· exp (Ω (Si, XU = XI,L))
=
ωL · σ2L(σ2θ + σ2H )(σ2H − σ2L) · exp (Ω (Si, XU = XI,H))
ωH · σ2H(σ2θ + σ2L)(σ2L − σ2H ) · exp (Ω (Si, XU = XI,L))
= −ωL · σ
2
L(σ
2
θ + σ
2
H
) · exp (Ω (Si, XU = XI,H))
ωH · σ2H(σ2θ + σ2L) · exp (Ω (Si, XU = XI,L))
,
(129)
it becomes evident that the above ratio is always < 0. This makes apparent that 0 is always in
between the two function values FOC(XI,l) and FOC(XI,H).
The intermediate value theorem states that
”If f is continuous on a closed interval [a, b], and c is any number between f(a)
and f(b) inclusive, then there is at least one number x in the closed interval such
that f(x) = c if a continuous function, f, with an interval, [x, y], as its domain
takes values f(x) and f(y) at each end of the interval, then it also takes any value
between f(x) and f(y) at some point within the interval.”
Putting together all three parts of the proof, there exists a value of XU , in a space bounded
by XI,l and XI,H for which FOC(XU ) = 0. As FOC(XU ) is monotone, 0 is crossed only once
and the optimal value of XU maximizing the agents utility is unique.
A.7 Proof of Proposition 2
Proof. Defining the uninformed agents’ utility in the respective regimes as a function of Si and
Pλ,i with
ΛL(Si, XU (Pλ,i)) = −α
(
RW0U + (E[θ|SL]−RP )XU (Pλ,i)− αXU (Pλ,i)
2
2
V ar[θ|SL]
)
ΛH(Si, XU (Pλ,i)) = −α
(
RW0U + (E[θ|SH ]−RP )XU (Pλ,i)− αXU (Pλ,i)
2
2
V ar[θ|SH ]
) (130)
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given S = SH plugging the indirect demand into the FOC, one gets
0 = ωL ·
(
α
(
(E[θ|SL]−RP )− αV ar[θ|SL]
[
u
1− λ −
λ
1− λ
E[θ|SH ]−RP
αV ar[θ|SH ]
]))
exp (ΛL(SH , Pλ,H))
+ωH ·
(
α
(
(E[θ|SH ]−RP )− αV ar[θ|SH ]
[
u
1− λ −
λ
1− λ
E[θ|SH ]−RP
αV ar[θ|SH ]
]))
exp (ΛH(SH , Pλ,H))
(131)
which can be reduced to
0 =
ωL · α
1− λ
(
(1− λ)(E[θ|SL]−RP ) + λV ar[θ|SL]
V ar[θ|SH ] (E[θ|SH ]−RP )− αuV ar[θ|SL]
)
exp (ΛL(SH , Pλ,H))
+
ωH · α
1− λ ((E[θ|SH ]−RP )− αuV ar[θ|SH ]) exp (ΛH(SH , Pλ,H)) .
(132)
Simplifying and collecting the Pλ,i that are not in the exponential on one side yields an implicit
equilibrium price function for the scenario in which Si = SH
Pλ,H = ωL
(
(1− λ)E[θ|SL] + λV ar[θ|SL]
V ar[θ|SH ] (E[θ|SH ]− αuV ar[θ|SL]
)
· exp (ΛL(SH , Pλ,H))(
ωL
V ar[θ|SH ]− λ(V ar[θ|SH ]− V ar[θ|SL])
V ar[θ|SH ] · exp (ΛL(SH , Pλ,H)) + ωH · exp (ΛH(SH , Pλ,H))
)
+ ωH
(E[θ|SH ]− αuV ar[θ|SH ]) · exp (ΛH(SH , Pλ,H))(
ωL
V ar[θ|SH ]− λ(V ar[θ|SH ]− V ar[θ|SL])
V ar[θ|SH ] · exp (ΛL(SH , Pλ,H)) + ωH · exp (ΛH(SH , Pλ,H).)
)
(133)
Plugging in Pλ,H = ˆPλ,H =
1
R
((E[θ|SH ]− αuV ar[θ|SH ]) yields
0 =
ωL · α
1− λ ((1− λ)(E[θ|SL]− E[θ|SH ]) + (1− λ)αu(V ar[θ|SH ]− V ar[θ|SL])) exp
(
ΛL(SH , ˆPλ,H)
)
0 = ωL · α ((E[θ|SL]− E[θ|SH ]) + αu(V ar[θ|SH ]− V ar[θ|SL])) exp
(
ΛL(SH , ˆPλ,H)
)
.
(134)
Plugging in Pλ,H = ˆPλ,L =
1
R
((E[θ|SL]− αuV ar[θ|SL]) results in
0 =
ωL · α
1− λ λ
V ar[θ|SL]
V ar[θ|SH ] ((E[θ|SH ]− E[θ|SL])− αu(V ar[θ|SH ]− V ar[θ|SL])) exp
(
ΛL(SH , ˆPλ,L)
)
+
ωH · α
1− λ ((E[θ|SH ]− E[θ|SL])− αu(V ar[θ|SH ]− V ar[θ|SL])) exp
(
ΛH(SH , ˆPλ,L)
)
.
(135)
Setting up the ratio between 135 and 134 it becomes apparent that the two prices under perfect
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information constitute the bounds of the equilibrium price
ωL · α
1− λ λ
V ar[θ|SL]
V ar[θ|SH ] ((E[θ|SH ]− E[θ|SL])− αu(V ar[θ|SH ]− V ar[θ|SL])) exp
(
ΛL(SH , ˆPλ,L)
)
ωL · α ((E[θ|SL]− E[θ|SH ]) + αu(V ar[θ|SH ]− V ar[θ|SL])) exp
(
ΛL(SH , ˆPλ,H)
)
+
ωH · α
1− λ ((E[θ|SH ]− E[θ|SL])− αu(V ar[θ|SH ]− V ar[θ|SL])) exp
(
ΛH(SH , ˆPλ,L)
)
ωL · α ((E[θ|SL]− E[θ|SH ]) + αu(V ar[θ|SH ]− V ar[θ|SL])) exp
(
ΛL(SH , ˆPλ,H)
) ,
(136)
which can be rearranged as
− λ
1− λ
V ar[θ|SL]
V ar[θ|SH ] ((E[θ|SL]− E[θ|SH ]) + αu(V ar[θ|SH ]− V ar[θ|SL])) exp
(
ΛL(SH , ˆPλ,L)
)
((E[θ|SL]− E[θ|SH ]) + αu(V ar[θ|SH ]− V ar[θ|SL])) exp
(
ΛL(SH , ˆPλ,H)
)
+
− ωH
1− λ ((E[θ|SL]− E[θ|SH ]) + αu(V ar[θ|SH ]− V ar[θ|SL])) exp
(
ΛH(SH , ˆPλ,L)
)
ωL ((E[θ|SL]− E[θ|SH ]) + αu(V ar[θ|SH ]− V ar[θ|SL])) exp
(
ΛL(SH , ˆPλ,H)
) ,
(137)
and simplified to
− 1
1− λ
λ V ar[θ|SL]
V ar[θ|SH ] ·
exp
(
ΛL(SH , ˆPλ,L)
)
exp
(
ΛL(SH , ˆPλ,H)
) + ωH
ωL
·
exp
(
ΛH(SH , ˆPλ,L)
)
exp
(
ΛL(SH , ˆPλ,H)
)
 . (138)
Adapting the identical approach for S = SL
XU (Pλ,L) =
u
1− λ −
λ
1− λ
E[θ|SL]−RPλ,L
αV ar[θ|SL] . (139)
Analogous to above plugging the indirect demand into the FOC, one gets
0 = ωL ·
(
α
(
(E[θ|SL]−RP )− αV ar[θ|SL]
[
u
1− λ −
λ
1− λ
E[θ|SL]−RP
αV ar[θ|SL]
]))
exp (ΛL(SL, Pλ,L))
+ωH ·
(
α
(
(E[θ|SH ]−RP )− αV ar[θ|SH ]
[
u
1− λ −
λ
1− λ
E[θ|SL]−RP
αV ar[θ|SL]
]))
exp (ΛH(SL, Pλ,L)) ,
(140)
which simplifies to
0 =
ωL · α
1− λ ((E[θ|SL]−RP )− αuV ar[θ|SL]) exp (ΛL(SL, Pλ,L))
+
ωH · α
1− λ
(
(1− λ)(E[θ|SH ]−RP ) + λV ar[θ|SH ]
V ar[θ|SL] (E[θ|SL]−RP )− αuV ar[θ|SH ]
)
exp (ΛH(SL, Pλ,L)) .
56
(141)
Plugging in Pλ,L = ˆPλ,L =
1
R
((E[θ|SL]− αuV ar[θ|SL]) one gets
0 =
ωH · α
1− λ ((1− λ)(E[θ|SH ]− E[θ|SL]) + (1− λ)αu(V ar[θ|SL]− V ar[θ|SH ])) exp
(
ΛH(SL, ˆPλ,L)
)
= ωH · α ((E[θ|SH ]− E[θ|SL]) + αu(V ar[θ|SL]− V ar[θ|SH ])) exp
(
ΛH(SL, ˆPλ,L)
)
.
(142)
Now using Pλ,L = ˆPλ,H =
1
R
((E[θ|SH ]− αuV ar[θ|SH ]) results in
0 =
ωL · α
1− λ ((E[θ|SL]− E[θ|SH ]) + αu(V ar[θ|SH ]− V ar[θ|SL])) exp
(
ΛL(SL, ˆPλ,H)
)
+
ωH · α
1− λ
λV ar[θ|SH ]
V ar[θ|SL] ((E[θ|SL]− E[θ|SH ]) + αu(V ar[θ|SH ]− V ar[θ|SL])) exp
(
ΛH(SL, ˆPλ,H)
)
.
(143)
Using rations again
=
ωL · α
1− λ ((E[θ|SL]− E[θ|SH ]) + αu(V ar[θ|SH ]− V ar[θ|SL])) exp
(
ΛL(SL, ˆPλ,H)
)
ωH · α ((E[θ|SH ]− E[θ|SL]) + αu(V ar[θ|SL]− V ar[θ|SH ])) exp
(
ΛH(SL, ˆPλ,L)
)
+
ωH · α
1− λ
λV ar[θ|SH ]
V ar[θ|SL] ((E[θ|SL]− E[θ|SH ]) + αu(V ar[θ|SH ]− V ar[θ|SL])) exp
(
ΛH(SL, ˆPλ,H)
)
ωH · α ((E[θ|SH ]− E[θ|SL]) + αu(V ar[θ|SL]− V ar[θ|SH ])) exp
(
ΛH(SL, ˆPλ,L)
)
(144)
− λ
1− λ
V ar[θ|SH ]
V ar[θ|SL] ((E[θ|SH ]− E[θ|SL]) + αu(V ar[θ|SL]− V ar[θ|SH ])) exp
(
ΛH(SL, ˆPλ,H)
)
((E[θ|SH ]− E[θ|SL]) + αu(V ar[θ|SL]− V ar[θ|SH ])) exp
(
ΛH(SL, ˆPλ,L)
)
+
− ωL
1− λ ((E[θ|SH ]− E[θ|SL]) + αu(V ar[θ|SL]− V ar[θ|SH ])) exp
(
ΛL(SL, ˆPλ,H)
)
ωh ((E[θ|SH ]− E[θ|SL]) + αu(V ar[θ|SL]− V ar[θ|SH ])) exp
(
ΛH(SL, ˆPλ,L)
)
(145)
which simplifies to
− 1
1− λ
λV ar[θ|SH ]
V ar[θ|SL] ·
exp
(
ΛH(SL, ˆPλ,H)
)
exp
(
ΛH(SL, ˆPλ,L)
) + ωL
ωH
·
exp
(
ΛL(SL, ˆPλ,H)
)
exp
(
ΛH(SL, ˆPλ,L)
)
 . (146)
The function implicitly characterizing the equilibrium demand 63 is again the derivative of a
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weighted sum of two MGFs and hence continuous. As both ratios, 138 as well as 146 are always
negative, by the intermediate value theorem, the equilibriumpricefunction has to cross zero at
least once, and the equilibrium price has to be bounded by the full information prices in each
scenario.
Looking at 134, 135, 143 and 142, notice that the implicit price function is always positive
for Pλ,i = ˆPλ,H for all (Si − θ) > −αuσ2θ , while it is always negative for Pλ,i = ˆPλ,L for
all (Si − θ) < αuσ2θ in both signal regimes. Knowing that ˆPλ,L > ˆPλ,H∀(Si − θ) > −αuσ2θ ,
it becomes immediately apparent that ˆPλ,L constitutes the upper bound of the price level,
while ˆPλ,H defines the lower bound. Given (Si − θ) < −αuσ2θ , the signs switch and ˆPλ,L
constitutes the lower bound while ˆPλ,H the upper one. αuσ
2
θ is the amount that compensates
for the difference of the uncertainty discounts between the two full information prices given by
αu(V ar[θ|SH ]− V ar[θ|SL]).
58
